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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the grant of the trial court (Honorable John R. 
Anderson of the Eighth Judicial District Court in and for Duchesne County, 
Roosevelt Division, State of Utah (the "Trial Court")) of a post-remand 
summary judgment and final judgment. This Court has jurisdiction to 
decide this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
(a) Did the Trial Court err in not construing the limited facts 
available to it in the light most favorable to Leo W. Hardy, M.D. ("Dr. 
Hardy") as the nonmoving party? 
(b) Did the Trial Court err in not allowing the jury to determine the 
reasonableness of the duration of the contract? 
(c) Did the Trial Court err in not allowing additional discovery to 
develop the record so the scope of the "just clause" provision could be fairly 
determined? 
(d) Did the Trial Court err in not allowing the jury to determine 
whether or not Uintah Basin Medical Center ("UBMC") had "just cause" to 
terminate Dr. Hardy? 
Standard of Review: The Trial Court's application of law to the 
undisputed facts in summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. Trujillo 
2 
v. Utah Dep't. o/Transp., 1999 UT App 227, ^[12, 986 P.2d 752. Further, 
"[i]n reviewing a grant of summary judgment, [ ] the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom" are viewed "in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party," Surety Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, 
Inc., 2000 UT 71 , 1(15, 10 P.3d 338. 
D E T E R M I N A T I V E LAW 
The decision in this appeal is governed by common law and thus no 
statutes, constitutional provisions, ordinances, or rules are determinative. 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E CASE 
Na tu re of the Case, Cour se of Proceeding, and Disposition Below 
This is a breach of contract case involving a professional services 
contract for pathology services (the "Agreement") entered into by Dr. Hardy 
and UBMC.1 The Agreement, executed on November 29, 1994, recited no 
termination date, but ins tead was terminable "for just cause." Dr. Hardy 
performed under the Agreement to the complete satisfaction of all 
concerned, i.e., doctors, patients, medical staff, and UBMC administration. 
No member of the UBMC administration or medical staff ever expressed 
any concern whatsoever over Dr. Hardy's performance between November 
A true and correct copy of Dr. Hardy's contract is included in the 
Addendum as Exhibit "A". 
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of 1994 and July of 1996 UBMC terminated the Agreement on July 18, 
1996. 
In the spring of 1996, Dr. Thomas J. Allred ("Dr. Allred") contacted 
UBMC to inquire whether UBMC would be interested in hiring a full time 
pathologist who was also certified as an emergency room physician. UBMC 
invited Dr. Allred to visit the hospital and shortly thereafter, on July 18, 
1996, the UBMC Board of Trustees ("the "Board") voted to terminate Dr. 
Hardy's contract and to offer Dr. Allred a position as director of pathology 
and part-time emergency room physician. 
UBMC gave Dr. Hardy 90 days written notice of termination on July 
29, 1996, without giving any reason in the letter for terminating the 
Agreement. When Dr. Hardy objected that UBMC did not have just cause to 
terminate the Agreement, UBMC filed a declaratory judgment action 
seeking to determine the parties' rights under the Agreement. The parties 
filed-cross motions for summary judgment on Dr. Hardy's breach of 
contract claim, which were both denied on October 19, 1998. After the 
completion of discovery, the parties agreed to stipulated facts and refiled 
motions for summary judgment on the legal question of whether Dr. Hardy's 
"just cause" contract was enforceable under Utah law. 
4 
The Trial Court heard oral arguments on the renewed motions for 
summary judgment and ruled from the bench that Dr. Hardy's "just cause" 
contract was enforceable under Utah law, and the question of whether 
UBMC had just cause to terminate the Agreement was for the jury to decide 
as a question of fact. The Trial Court then allowed the parties to file 
additional briefs on the issue of whether successor UBMC boards could be 
bound by the Agreement or whether the Agreement was voidable by a 
successor board. On April 6, 2000, the Trial Court ruled that the Agreement 
could not be enforced against UBMC's successor Boards. The Trial Court 
further ruled that because the eleven-member Board in place when the 
Agreement was terminated had three new members, it was a successor 
Board and hence it could terminate the Agreement at any time. On that 
basis, the Trial Court denied Dr. Hardy's renewed motion f6r summary 
judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of UBMC. 
On June 1, 2000, Dr. Hardy filed a Notice of Appeal, thereby 
appealing the Trial Court's order and judgment granting Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment entered on May 18, 2000. On August 30, 2002, the 
Utah Supreme Court issued an opinion holding that because the contract 
involved a proprietary function, it was enforceable against successor boards 
if the contract was for a reasonable duration. See Uintah Basin Med. Ctr, v. 
5 
Hardy, 2002 UT 92,1J18, 54 P 3 d 1165, a copy of which is included in the 
Addendum as Exhibit " B " . The Utah Supreme Court remanded the case 
back to the Trial Court instructing the court to develop the record and to 
determine the scope of the "just cause" provision. 
On February 18, 2003, UBMC filed its Post Remand Motion for 
Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Motion to Bifurcate, On April 
15, 2003, Dr. Hardy filed his Opposition to the Post Remand Motion for 
Summary Judgment, requesting, inter alia, that additional discovery be 
taken in order to develop the record pursuant to the Supreme Court 's 
direction on remand. The Trial Court did not allow additional discovery and 
granted UBMC's Post Remand Motion for Summary Judgment by Ruling 
dated June 12, 2003 (the "Ruling").2 See R. 1624-26, in which the Court 
held that the contract "cannot be viewed as including a reasonable 
duration." (R. 1625). The Court also concluded that "the intended scope of 
the just cause clause provided limited discretion to future boards, and is 
unusual when comparing Dr. Hardy's contract to other contracts typically 
entered into by Uintah Basin Medical Center with other medical 
professionals, and as such the contracts duration was unreasonable making 
the contract unenforceable, . ." (R. 1625). 
A true and correct copy of the Ruling is included in the Addendum as 
Exhibit " C " . 
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The Trial Court made its decision based on no additional discovery, 
even though Dr. Hardy requested additional depositions, and the Utah 
Supreme Court ordered development of the record. Dr. Hardy did, however, 
submit a declaration regarding his understanding of the "just cause" 
provision in compliance with the Utah Supreme Court ' s opinion. See R. at 
1546.3 The Trial Court dismissed Dr. Hardy's declaration as self-serving, 
not as an attempt to develop the record as ordered by the Utah Supreme 
Court. In addition, the Trial Court did not allow the taking of Dr. Wayne T. 
Stewart 's ("Dr. Stewart") deposition, another physician at UBMC whose 
contract terms closely mirrored Dr. Hardy's . The Trial Court simply 
dismissed this contract as "atypical." Notwithstanding, the Trial Court 
opined that "when comparing Dr. Hardy's contract to other medical 
professionals typically entered into by Uintah Basin Medical Center, the 
vast majority of those contracts provide a specific duration, and a provision 
allowing either party to terminate the contract after giving the appropriate 
notice." (R. 1624-25). Dr. Hardy was not allowed to conduct discovery in 
an effort to explain the reasons for the language in his contract. The Trial 
Court ' s refusal to allow additional discovery is in complete disregard of the 
Utah Supreme Court 's directive to the Trial Court to develop the record. 
A true and correct copy of Dr. Hardy's declaration is included in the 
Addendum as Exhibit "D" . 
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On July 31, 2003, Dr. Hardy, by and through his counsel, filed a 
Notice of Appeal from the final judgment dated July 10, 2003 of the 
Honorable John R. Anderson, Eighth Judicial District Court of Duchesne 
County, Roosevelt Division.4 
Statement of Facts 
1. Dr. Hardy is a board certified pathologist. (R. 189). 
2. UBMC is the business name for Duchesne County Hospital, which 
is owned by Duchesne County and operated by UBMC's Board of Trustees. 
(R. 304). 
3. On November 29, 1994, Dr. Hardy and UBMC entered into the 
Agreement in which Dr. Hardy agreed to provide professional services for 
UBMC as director of the hospital's pathology laboratory and to perform 
related duties. The language of the Agreement was taken from a contract 
between UBMC and Dr. Joseph J. Sannella ("Dr. Sannella")(a pathologist at 
UBMC who immediately preceded Dr. Hardy). Dr. Hardy modified the 
contract slightly and returned the edited contract to UBMC. The Agreement 
was then typed onto Duchesne County Hospital letterhead and signed by 
Bradley D. LeBaron, who was UBMC's administrator and who had authority 
to enter into personal service contracts on UBMC's behalf. Although the 
A true and correct copy of the Judgment is included in the Addendum as 
Exhibit "E". 
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Agreement was executed on November 29, 1994, it became effective August 
1, 1994, the date upon which Dr. Hardy first began providing pathology 
services to UBMC. (R. 185-86, 189, 546). 
4. Paragraph 11 of the Agreement provides: 
This agreement shall become effective August 1, 
1994 and continue to bind the parties to the terms 
hereof until terminated after ninety (90) days written 
notice lor just cause of termination by either party or 
by mutual consent of the parties to a shorter notice 
period. 
(R. 185-86, 546). 
5. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Dr. Hardy agreed to (a) be 
available for physician consults to interpret laboratory results; (b) visit the 
UBMC hospital weekly for one to two hours to recommend processes and 
policies to assure smooth operation of the UBMC laboratory, and (c) 
undertake teaching activities when new procedures were introduced. (R. 
185-86). 
6. The Board is the entity authorized to terminate personal services 
contracts. (R. 546). 
7. Pursuant to the Bylaws, the Board can terminate membership on 
the medical staff: 
"for any purpose reasonably related to the delivery 
of quality patient care services, including but not 
limited to: 
9 
(a) The Hospital 's ability to provide services related 
to a medical specialty or sub-specialty; 
(b) The Hospital 's patient load; 
(c) The determination that granting Medical Staff 
membership is inconsistent with the mission, role 
and purpose of the Hospital; 
(d) The Failure of the practitioner to comply with 
the terms of the Hospital or Medical Staff Bylaws, 
rules and regulations; 
(e) Any other reason specified in these or the 
Medical Staff Bylaws or others not specified which 
are reasonably related to the delivery of quality 
patient care. 
(R. 994). 
8. On July 18, 1996, the Board voted to terminate the Agreement and 
to invite Dr. Allred to join U B M C ' s medical staff as a pathologist and as an 
emergency room physician. (R. 290A, 290-91, 304, 545). 
9. Dr. Hardy continued working for UBMC until October 28, 1996, 
approximately 90 days after UBMC notified him it was terminating the 
Agreement. (R. 189, 545). 
10. Prior to his termination, Dr. Hardy performed his obligations 
under the Agreement satisfactorily and received no complaints whatsoever 
from UBMC or its medical staff. After termination of the Agreement, on a 
few occasions, at the request of members of the UBMC medical staff, and 
with the approval of the UBMC administration, Dr. Hardy performed 
10 
limited pathology services for members of the UBMC medical staff in Dr. 
Allred's absence. (R. 189 ,545) . 
11. Dr. Joseph J. Sannella was the pathologist who preceded Dr. 
Hardy and his contract had language identical to Dr. Hardy 's stating that the 
contract would "continue to bind the parties to the terms [ ] until after 
ninety (90) days written notice for just cause of termination by either party 
or by mutual consent of the parties to a shorter notice period." (R. 1538). 
A true and correct copy of Dr. Sannella's contract is included in the 
Addendum as Exhibit " F " . 
12. Dr. Wayne T. Stewart was a radiologist at UBMC and his contract 
provided for termination only " ( a ) for the loss of a licence [sic] to practice 
in the State of Utah, or; (b) for the conviction of a felony, or; (c) by the 
mutual consent of both part ies." (R. 1458). A true and correct copy of Dr. 
Stewart 's contract is included in the Addendum as Exhibit "G". 
S U M M A R Y OF A R G U M E N T 
The Trial Court erred in not construing the facts available to it in the 
light most favorable to Dr. Hardy as the nonmoving party. Utah law is clear 
that "[a] trial court is not authorized to weigh facts in deciding a summary 
judgment motion, but is only to determine whether a dispute of material fact 
exists , . . ." Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, ^[24, 42 P.3d 
11 
379.5 Dr. Hardy presented ample evidence, even without developing the 
record as directed by the Supreme Court, to create a genuine issue of 
material fact upon which reasonable minds could differ. For instance, the 
very fact that UBMC entered into other contracts terminable for "just cause'5 
is sufficient evidence that Dr. Hardy's was not the first such contract, and 
that there was a precedent for contracts with "just cause" termination 
clauses. The Trial Court completely ignored these contracts which evidence 
UBMC's history of entering into contracts terminable for cause, and made a 
factual determination as to the type of contracts "typically" entered into by 
UBMC. The trier of fact, a jury in this case, is the proper party to determine 
what weight is to be given the contracts proffered by Dr. Hardy, not the 
Trial Court at the summary judgment stage. 
The Trial Court exceeded its authority in granting UBMC's motion for 
summary judgment, completely disregarding the purpose of summary 
judgment. Utah law is clear that: 
It is not the purpose of the summary judgment 
procedure to judge the credibility of the averments 
of parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence. 
Nor is it to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve 
disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is to eliminate 
5
 See also Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995) 
where the Court stated that "[o]n a motion for summary judgment, a trial 
court should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole inquiry should be 
whether material issues of fact exist." Id at 1100. 
12 
the time, trouble and expense of trial when upon any 
view taken of the facts as asserted by the party ruled 
against, he would not be entitled to prevail. Only 
when it so appears, is the court justified in refusing 
such a party the opportunity of presenting his 
evidence and attempting to persuade the fact trier to 
his views. Conversely, if there is any dispute as to 
any issue, material to the settlement of the 
controversy, the summary judgment should not be 
granted. 
Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). Because the Trial 
Court made credibility determinations and ignored disputed issues of fact 
favoring Dr. Hardy, the Trial Court 's granting of UBMC's post-remand 
motion for summary judgment should be reversed. 
The Trial Court erred in not allowing additional discovery to develop 
the record so the scope of the "just cause" provision in Dr. Hardy's contract 
could be fairly determined. The Utah Supreme Court remanded the case "to 
permit the district court to allow further development of the record . . ." 
Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 92 at 1fl8. Further, the Court suggested that it might 
be "useful to compare Dr. Hardy 's contract to the agreements UBMC 
typically enters into with medical professionals." Id. at ^[18. The Trial 
Court did not allow development of the record and dismissed evidence of 
other contracts with similar termination provisions. In this case, the Trial 
Court assumed the role of fact-finder without allowing additional discovery 
as directed by the Supreme Court. 
13 
The Trial Court erred in not allowing the jury to determine the 
reasonableness of the duration of Dr. Hardy's contract. On summary 
judgment, Judge Anderson must look at the evidence before him and 
determine whether there is enough evidence to proceed to trial A 
determination about reasonableness that includes weighing the evidence, 
and the credibility assigned to that evidence, should not take place at the 
summary judgment stage, but is left for the jury to decide at trial. In Uintah 
Basin, the Utah Supreme Court used the term "trial court7 ' liberally, but did 
not mean that the Court was to determine all of the issues. The Trial Court 
was to make only the initial determination of whether reasonable evidence 
existed to support Dr. Hardy ' s theory of the case. Historically, there are 
defined roles of judge and jury that need to be upheld. Questions of weight 
and credibility are jury questions, while questions of law are for the Court to 
decide. 
It is a well-settled contract law principle that the jury evaluates 
reasonableness of duration. See Green v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 526 A.2d 
1192, 1202-03 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); see also Stutzke v. D.G.C. Liquidation 
Co., 533 So.2d 897, 899 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Burger ChefSyst. Inc. v. 
Burger Chef of Fla., Inc. 317 So.2d 795,798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). 
14 
There is currently no Utah case law addressing this aspect of a jury's duty, 
and, therefore, this Court should clarify Utah law on this issue. 
Finally, the Trial Court erred in not allowing the jury to determine 
whether or not UBMC had "just cause" to terminate Dr. Hardy. Clearly 
defined roles of judge and jury are important, especially in situations where 
there are mixed questions of law and fact. Dr. Hardy has a right to have the 
jury determine not only the reasonableness of the contract duration, but 
whether or not UBMC had just cause to terminate him. The Trial Court 
overstepped its bounds by making these and other determinations on 
summary judgment (even after ruling that the question of whether UBMC 
had just cause to terminate the Agreement was for the jury to decide as a 
question of fact). See R. 737 & 1055. This Court should more clearly 
delineate the roles of judge and jury, specifically in the area of contract 
interpretation and application. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSTRUING THE 
FACTS AVAILABLE TO IT IN THE LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO DR. HARDY AS THE NONMOVING PARTY. 
It is well-settled that on summary judgment, a judge is charged with 
reviewing the evidence presented, construing that evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, and determining whether reasonable 
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minds could differ as to the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom. 
Summary judgment is meant to "weed out" cases that are so devoid of 
evidence that no reasonable person could find in favor of the nonmoving 
party. In this instance, the Trial Court was asked to make a threshold 
determination of whether the just cause provision created an unreasonable 
time duration for Dr. Hardy's contract. Stated somewhat differently, the 
Trial Court was directed to analyze whether a reasonable person could 
interpret the pertinent facts in such a way that made the durational element 
of Dr. Hardy 's Agreement (i.e., the occurrence of "just cause") appear 
reasonable. If there were sufficient facts that might lead a reasonable 
person to find the contract reasonable (at least with respect to the 
circumstances under which it could be terminated), then the Trial Court 's 
See Mountain States~Tele. & Tele. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 
Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984). 
7
 See Crawford-el v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998) where the Court 
stated that: 
summary judgment serves as the ultimate screen to 
weed out truly insubstantial lawsuits prior to trial. 
At that stage, if the defendant-official has made a 
properly supported motion, the plaintiff may not 
respond simply with general attacks upon the 
defendant 's credibility, but rather must identify 
affirmative evidence from which a jury could find 
that the plaintiff has carried his or her burden of 
proving the pertinent motive. 
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give the case to the jn (i.e., the trier of fact). If there was no possible way 
that a reasonable person could interpret the durational element as 
reasonable, then the Trial Court was obligated to grant the summary 
judgment motion ana ...w e^ the case away from thv iury. 
of the nonmoving parh * , b* . i laid>. ihere is no weighing or assessing 
the facts — the facts as presented by the non-movant are accepted as true. In 
this case (albeit withoiit the benefit of additional discovery), Dr. Hardy 
presented in^ . . . .. . . ACI j u i u . a ^ . ^ ^ p<~-~. 
provision reasonable, ihat is, UBMC had found that the practice of 
ensuring a doctor 's contract would continue (except, for example, in the 
instance of professional malfeasance on the part of the doctor or an 
extraordinary change . ..:c ^ ^ . a n c c o: .:.~ .. ,r.i, e 
( ' - T1 1 t * ( 
asked the Trial Court to develop the record as to what those benefits might 
be (e.g., attraction and retention of specialist that might not otherwise 
practice in a rural hospital such as UBMC) and to explore the downside to 
::::>•' i : 1 I : : i l t i i .• : t s 1 1 I : • I It : ,1 I Si ip i ei i le Coui t as! :e .d tl \ : I i ial Coui t to tal :e 
evidence o r --• • - n A^ . b:jn<^> 
contract term, which might include a more detailed examinati •- ' * hat the 
Board of Trustees intended when they approved Dr. Hardy's contract, why 
n. i lardy's contract differed from the other contracts with time limits, why 
uiMviL, wouia continue with Di Stewart 's contract (which is devoid of a 
.
c M
-
 i
 *
v
 : L :!' lii ] lit) ' :l11 1 i :: i i tl i s'l i : spital as ai giiii lg ii 1 tl: lis litigatioi 1 tl lat such 
a contract was unreasoi lable In essence , tl 1 2 I Jtal 1 Si lpi < "i :i 1 = C : »' n t 1 si :: : • :1 tl le 
Trial Court to survey the entire evidentiary landscape upon which Dr. 
Hardy's Agreement would be assessed and decide * . ther a reasonable 
person coulu somehow interpret the facts as advanced bv Dr. Hardy were 
r~\i^* ,u 
The r -
Court and mistakenly thought that the appellate court was asking the Trial 
Court to do something more than just the threshold inquiry that is required 
ii1 a summary judgment setting, l i i e trial Court did not ask whether the 
r
" ^ ' ^
r
-' -• * , .. . a i i_ . .uinpc^i . -
realm of assessin ,;.;' p " * • ••-nng 
example of the erroneous path taken K- the Trial Court was its categorical 
rejection of the two other contracts without specific time limits - Drs. 
18 
Sannella and Stewart's contract? ° .
 t . n * wm. ,iioiuu u<ivi looked at 
abe i i ational If it * as i ea soi lable f DI I IB} I C I : • 1: 1 : i 1 : i D i Stewart's contract 
even while disputing the reasonableness of Dr. Hardy's contract, it is 
certainly reasonable to think that UBMC saw value in such contracts. 
The assessments made by the Trial Court were well beyond the scope 
of the assignment give, - *.. . . ^ .. . . ^ coi.i^xi O; ^ ^ammary 
j u d g n - -
present evidence from which a iurv rrip-ht return a verdict in his favor. If he 
does-so, there is a genuine issue of fact that requii es a trial." Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986)(emphasis added).8 Finallv. 
the United States Supreme Court has helu uua ;nO issue of laci inusi oe 
\gei rt ill :ie " ai: id the t 1:1: I :::  i i : •! n :  i : ii ig pai t; " 'it i n i s t • :l : i :i : i : i = till: :i,;::::: .i I s i n i p h si l ::: 
that there *~ som~ metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 L-'.S- 574, 586 (198 *; 
this case, Dr. Hardy has presented more than enough genuine evidence, even 
8
 The Court in Liberty Lobby also stated that u[t]he inquiry performed is the 
threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial— 
whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly 
can be resolved only b> a finder of fact because they may reasonably be 
resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250. 
19 
v^iiiiuui *"*1" '
 w.i. A^iDit minus cuuiu 
differ as to the evidence and inferences J-
i* The Trial Court Infringed on the J ui y's Duty By. Weighing 
the Evidence and Determining Reasonableness of Duration. 
remand, utc •, i ial Court was charged with developing the record in 
°'"<K' „jicii:iine reasonableness. Instead, the Trial Court 
deten :r % ••
 ;u Ai ...u-.. i _ , .. i.,^ », vvas 
necessary for Judge Anderson t - : -- *!, r, >, 
limited purpose of determining whether there was enough evidence ' * i 
inai , .in uie while viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Dr. Hardy, 
J u —bij Lij evidence at the summary judgment stage, and to 
It is clear from the Rntin-
facts available to it in tlie light most favorable to Dr. Hai.h With I " 
considering additional evidence, the Trial Court determined that the scope 
.aus i provision io narrow and the duration is unreasonable. 
The ' • J - - _ iaci^c Deiorc the Court 
without further development o' : * 
j ' o n e are sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact where 
9
 See Liberty Lobby, 411 U.S. at 255 where the Court held that "[credibi l i ty 
1
 '* "rminations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate 
rences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, "" 
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reasonable minds cou '-in-, i * *M instance, the «. -idli Supreme Court notui 
UT 92 at ^[18, note 4. Hie Trial Court complete* - ^ r e r a rded this and all 
other facts favoring Dr. Hardy, adopting wholeheartedly L J M C ' s recitation 
of the facts and Inferences drawn therefrom. 
. jdidy 5 pleadings are replete with facts proving that his contract 
a^  fLU« ., . ^ w4lwLi.ijtances o- n ^ practice anu 
reasonable minds coulu differ on the interpretation ui the facts regarding the 
reasonableness of the contract 's duration and "just cause" issues, and, 
therefore, Judge Anderson's grant of summary j . 'w nent should be reversed. 
B. The Trial Court vidence of t) 
Contracts in a Ligni iviost favorable to Dr. * 
contract was unreasonable when compared to contracts UBMC entered into 
with other physicians. The Court ignored Drs. Sannella and Stewart's 
contracts, neither oi vvi. = , u includes a duration. See R. at 1460 & 1539. 
t u p ^ a i . gesicu c c » ioview , i uiher contracts 
Trial Court infringed on the i 'vy 's role when * u ^ other factors. 
Further, ..^ *,4 . , ou , cannot make a determination as to the significance 
: il: Di s Sai u iella' s ai id St 2 i<\ ai t s coi iti acts vis a vis Dr. I lardy's contract. 
it and construed those contracts ] ' ' ' D 
determine whether reasonable minds could differ on the interpretation and 
application of those contracts to Dr. Hardy 's . Reasonable minds could 
easnj diitei ^n uie interpretation and application of those contracts to Dr. 
duration ot m 
At least two, and maybe more, ^f U R M f - - 1 
provisions either identical or similar to Dr. Hard} o "just cause" provision, 
and do not specify a duration. The jury should determine whether these two 
contracts, and perhaps others not yet discovered, are sufficient evidence to 
pr" 1' Il Il l '"i, . iili ,i I 1 , in, I 1, I „ .luJoiuLle, 
The Trial Court ai i -
Utah Supreme Court, asuggest that UBMC routinely enters into agreements 
under which the only practical durational limit is a liberally-construed cjust 
cause' provisioi ' " ' I it itah Basin, 2002 1 1 1 92 at ^[18, note 4, Althougli n i:i 
e s s a 1: ;; • I: :> s 1 11: • i 1 ' • 2 s 1 11 1 11 1 1 a 1 3 j u d g 1 1 1 e 1 11, a t 11: 1 e v e r y 1 e a ^  i, . . 
should u * • n - ' " • e 
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record on this issue, including a survey of all contracts UKU U B M L iiad wiih 
othei doctors at tho i,. - u ; . i ^ ^ y ., contract was entered 
A, • I -I SCO VERY IN w u . i i« TO I * u r I I I JL 
R L _ _ u u i HAT T H E SCOPE A M ) KEASi J t ! FNFSS OF 
THE JUST CAUSE PROVISION CAN BE F A I R L Y 
DETERMINED. 
UBMC has a history of contracting with physicians for jobs 
terminable for cause.10 Dr. Hardy has alleged this in previous pleadings, 
anc lac Utah 5upreme Court recognized that UBN 1C" s contract histoi > is 
I: 1 e s :: : p • : • o f 11: l e " ' j i i s t : c i i s • : •" ' p i : i s i : i: I 11 l i c :: t 11 I e 
Utah Supreme ' uurt werit so far as to remand this matter to the Trial Court 
"to allow further development of the record.' Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 92 at 
TjlS. The Trial fY^r; \ nored i \ r directive and did not allow the additional 
discovery requested bv : iaivij. 
U i ^ K J * . ' v. I ' l l 
11 r () ^ ' i 1 11 r :I;; :" s z s i i • : • t 1:1: i • ::; I: i i s t t : ;:: o i it a i i I i *" " j \ I s t cause7 ' provision, 
questioned Dr. Hardy's understanding of the provision, and completely 
ignored the Supreme Court 's determination that u[u]nder the bylaws, 'just 
cause ' appears to have a broad scope: " i : i 1 ' [J18, note 4. 
Drs, Sannella and Stewart both had contracts with UBMC that were 
terminable for cause. 
A. Summary Judgment is Not Appropriate When Discovery is 
Not Complete. 
iiiv v, ,,.ti .>uprerrk v^ourt acknuvwougcu m Urysdale v iord Motor 
. i ^u . . . ... ,... L~ ... _ iw present their 
r noPo «;. • , , i p , , i . s s 
it is obvious from the evidence before the court that the p ^ - y onnos^ * 
judgment caw establish no right to recovery."1 7<i. at 680 (citing Mountain 
States Tely 681 P.2d at 1261 ' ^ Court went on fo state that "[p]rior to 
the completion , , scovery, however, a u OKUI diiticuit to ascertain 
v rhetl i,e i tl I s i I : i 
c a s e , s u m m a r y ?:• 1 - ^ 
additional discovery, Di. Hardy has offered sufficient evidence to survive 
summary judgment, creating a genuine issue of material fact on which 
reasonable nimd^ 
s necessary . . .nis case to determine 
whether IJRMP * - • * 
for cause. DL. Hardy L . ually interested in finding out why UBMC entered 
into contracts similar to !us, without durations, with Drs. Sannella and 
Mewart r\ v
 i m a ^nu, . laruv has a right to depose Dr. Stewart regarding 
argued on summary judgment mat lurmer discovery 
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as to the terms ot nio contract .-.n, • .J :»^ —a contract that permits 
Judgment where Dr. Hardy's counsel asks about the terms of Dr. Stewart 's 
contract with UBMC and UBMC's counsel instructs him not to answe ^ . 
i m n \ Regarding Dr. Stewart 's contract, why did UBMC continue to honor 
a contract GCVO.U OI a .^rationa. .m*-.. «... * , Lcwart's, w hen. the hospital 
> • n n • n LSO! ial: le \ ' 1 1 lese 
are all questions that need to be answered h ? r - .nr..^ . n r ~ r .... 
determined. 
Further, UBMC refused in the past to provide other UBMC contracts 
which were requested iV Dr. Haiuy. Although it provided some of these 
i * i J . J . . . i * * * . i * : * u
 n o 
"negotiated a few contracts, primarily in the 1980 o, that had indefinite 
durations to entice doctors to work at UBMC." (R , 1415). UBMC has not 
produced those contracts U, i .> Hardy anu ilicy are relevan. in deieiaiining 
11: i (: t;; J: • e s :> f :: :> i I 11: a c t s I I B 1 v 1 C ' t} j : • i c a 11 y e i 11 e t: s i i: I t : • i t II: i i i l • = • • :i i c a 1 
p r o f e s s i o n a 1, : " ' [ r, : » 11 a l • B < i s.- : • 2 0 0 2 1 1 1 ' 9 2 t % • 18 I I: i > : i : i 3 s i o i I c • o n fI r m s 
that U B M C did, in facL ^ 'p ic : i l 'y en te r into con t r ac t s wi th indef in i te 
durations when circumstances called for it. It makes no difference when 
UIII'V 1C entered those contracts, o n v ^^- * • Surely a jury could iind 
contract. 
Dr. Hardy should be allowed to find out why some of UBMC's 
contracts contain durational limits, while others, like his, are terminable 
only for cause. A1 a r the distinction? Dr. Hardy believes that the answer 
l v^ow^w . , oinM .. . ihe contracts UICIL udVv. uaratioiuil limits cover 
hospital. Dr. Hardy is a hospital-^a-r 
doctors for his practice. Dr. Hardy (like Dr. Stewart who is a radiologist) 
does not have private patients. Rather, Dr. Hardy's pathology practice is a 
medical service made available to other doctors who may have patients at 
Lc^cuueu :-.:„ argument altogether. 
i^u«aitiOnallv\ how d o 11: 1 * • :i \ i r a 1: i o n a 1 : : i I 11 a :: t s • • : i 1 :: (l "' D • :: 11 i, *;; z I 11 o i i l a t i c a 1 1) 
renew every few years? If so, how is this different from Dr. Hardy's 
contract? Realistically, the durational contracts, if they automatically 
renew, are terminable lor cause, meaning they are based on that physician's 
I il 11 k \ > ,1011 ll I I IM|H.' | I 11 
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In aduuiux. l a r a y m a y w i s h to h i re an aUuit iui ia i expe r t , or 
q i i a I i f; a i 1 e x I s t i n • g e x p • e i I: : • i 1 1 1 i • * i s s i 1 = • : • f s t a i i d a i • :l • : • : i: 111 a : t j : r : i i s i o i: 1 s 
as pathologists or tadiologists. What is the "industry practice" of rural 
hospitals in contracting with hospital-based physicians? UBMC admits that 
it uses the indefinite contract terminable only for cause when it has trouble 
attracting doctors, aiu; ,Ae approach taker i by other hospitals surel) ill 
5
 v. 
cause" provision in Dr. Hardy 's contract. (R. 1415). In essence, the Utah 
Supreme Court asked the Trial Couu lu survey the entire landscape upon 
which Dr. Hardy's Agreement would be assessed and decide whether a 
reasonable person couiU bomeiiow interpret tl: le f acts as advanced b> Di 
a fair de te rmina te - ^l ••* *h - r ^T'orv-h!--. ^ . * Agreement 
cannot possibly be m a c . 
B
- The Scope of the " J u s t Cause" Provision Relates to UBMC's 
Unders t and ing of its Own Rights and Powers to Te rmina te a 
Physician, Not Dr. H a r d y ' s Unde r s t and ing of the Te rm, 
declaration which detai: his understands *- •• •'" :— t cause." 
UBMC was successful .;; convincing the ' n i a . Couu that Dr. Hardy's 
-..:. o.ancung 01 just cause" is relevant to determining the scope of the 
' " ; ji i.;sill: :a;i i s e r p i : • i s i : i :i I I- :> ' • : • :: i , D i I "k i • :ib " s i n idei star idii ig of tl le meaning 
of the term "just ca i r ^ cr 
the scope of the "just cause" provision •' depends in larr r? - , u -•-• 
of discretion [the] provision gives to successor boards." Uintah Basin, 2002 
1 at 1| lo. The Utah Supreme Court noted that under UBMC's bylaws, 
appears L ..ave a broad scope: » •. nstance, the board may 
t 4 I i .(I ;J ,1II I I ill ..jUIiJL ._, . - . « . . -
to the delivery of quality patient care.111 J } 
misapplied Uintah Basin and stated that "[g]iven Dr. Hardy's understanding 
of the intended scope of the just cause clause in lijju of the Utah Supreme 
C ., opinion, LiiO contract olicicd utile discretion to successor boards." 
( * ' • ^ > ..,-. ueicii.iiiic uuu ... just cause" 
provision in Dr. '1;I?YK ' ' -nnrm: 
opposite as noted above. Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 92 af *:1 v note H. JLL IS 
clear that it makes no difference what Dr. Hardy understands "just cause" to 
meaiI I'he scope ot the *, iause applies to UBMC's power and/or 
, .po. L.I; • board of 
Trustees' int^rr 
under which UBMC mi- :r terminate Dr. Hard' '- * 
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should be on UBMC, not on what Dr. Hardy thought were the instances 
where he could be terminated. 
Even if the scope revolved around Dr. Hardy's understanding, this 
Court should find that the Trial Court erred in making credibility 
determinations at the summary judgment stage. Dr. Hardy 's declaration was 
submitted simply to expand on his understanding of the meaning of "just 
cause," and it in no way contradicts his deposition testimony.11 The Trial 
Court continued down its errant path by passing judgment on the declaration 
submitted by Dr. Hardy. Rather than seeing the declaration for what it was 
(i.e., an exposition of the circumstances where Dr. Hardy 's contract might 
be terminated for reasons other than those arising from Dr. Hardy's 
performance), the Trial Court dismissed it as self-serving. In light of the 
Utah Supreme Court 's directive to outline the instances where the contract 
might be terminated,'Dr. Hardy addressed those instances where his 
profession (pathology) or the circumstances of the hospital (e.g., closure of 
the hospital for myriad reasons) might radically change, thereby permitting 
a termination of the contract. In no way did Dr. Hardy contradict what he 
said at his deposition; rather he addressed a question that was not asked of 
him at his deposition: are there circumstances, other than Dr. Hardy's 
See relevant portions of Dr. Hardy 's deposition at R. 1389-93, a true and 
correct copy of which is included in the Addendum as Exhibit " H ' \ 
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professional performance, that would permit UBMC to terminate Dr. 
Hardy's contract? The answer was and still is yes. For unforeseen reasons, 
UBMC might be forced to close down (e.g., financial reasons, inability of 
doctors to obtain malpractice insurance, declining population in the Uintah 
Basin, etc.). The question of whether the hospital might have a legal 
justification for terminating the contract was never asked of Dr. Hardy at his 
deposition, but in light of the Utah Supreme Court decision, Dr. Hardy 
needed to answer that question, which he did in his declaration. 
Irrespective of those cataclysmic or professional reasons that might 
allow UBMC to walk away from Dr. Hardy's Agreement (closure of the 
hospital, elimination of his specialty), Dr. Hardy's position on termination 
has remained crystal clear: so long as UBMC had need of pathology 
services and provided Dr. Hardy was providing those services in a 
professionally competent manner, then UBMC was obligated to continue 
with the arrangement it had with Dr. Hardy. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly stated its position on the issue of 
post-deposition statements in Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983) 
where the Court held that "when a party takes a clear position in a 
deposition, that is not modified on cross-examination, he may not thereafter 
raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit which contradicts his 
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deposition.. ." Id. at 1172-73 (emphasis added). Dr. Hardy was asked 
during his deposition what he thought "just cause" meant. He gave an 
honest answer. Dr. Hardy's declaration is simply an expansion of his 
deposition answer, not a contradiction as required in Webster. 
The Trial Court also erred when it determined that Dr. Hardy's 
declaration could not be relied upon. It is not proper at the summary 
judgment stage for the Trial Court to assess the credibility or reliability of 
Dr. Hardy's declaration as compared to his deposition testimony. See 
Trujillo, 986 P.2d at ^[42 (the question of credibility should not be 
determined on summary judgment). 
I I I . W H E T H E R OR N O T DR. H A R D Y ' S C O N T R A C T DURATION IS 
REASONABLE IS A QUESTION OF F A C T F O R THE JURY. 
In Uintah Basin, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[wjhether a 
contract 's duration is ' reasonable ' depends on the circumstances of each 
case." Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 92 at 1J17.13 The Trial Court must determine 
whether there is enough evidence for a jury to find in Dr. Hardy's favor 
regarding reasonableness of duration, but once the Court makes that 
determination, fact issues, like whether the duration of the contract is 
See also Mountain States, 681 P.2d at 1261. 
Whether the use of the term "district court" in the opinion was a result of 
carelessness, €ase of reference, or the status of the case on appeal, it 
certainly does not mean that the Judge is to decide every issue. 
31 
actually reasonable, and whether UBMC had just cause to terminate its 
contract with Dr. Hardy, predominate and are left for the jury. In addition, 
if extrinsic evidence is necessary to determine the intent of the parties, then 
the determination should be reserved for the jury.14 There is ample evidence 
in this case on which reasonable minds could differ, and the jury should be 
allowed to weigh the evidence and make a determination as to 
reasonableness of Dr. Hardy's contract duration. 
A. Extrinsic Evidence is Admissible in this Case to Determine 
Reasonableness. 
There is relevant extrinsic evidence in this case that should be 
provided to the trier of fact. Black 's Law Dictionary defines "extrinsic 
evidence" as "[ejvidence relating to a contract but not appearing on the face 
of the contract because it comes from other sources, such as statements 
between the parties or_the circumstances surrounding the agreement." 
B L A C K ' S L A W DICTIONARY 578 (7th ed. 1999). The Supreme Court noted 
the importance of U B M C s past contractual practices with its physicians. 
This evidence is extrinsic as it does not appear on the face of the contract. 
14
 See Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) where the 
Court stated that "[g]enerally, when contract interpretation will be 
determined by extrinsic evidence of intent, it becomes a question of fact." 
Id. at 871. The Court went on to hold that "if [the] extrinsic evidence is 
disputed, then a material fact is also disputed, and summary judgment 
cannot be granted." Id. 
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This and other evidence relevant to the reasonableness determination is 
necessary for a fair interpretation of Dr. Hardy's contract. Extrinsic 
evidence is used to prove intent as set forth in Ward v. Intermountain 
Farmers Assoc, 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995) where the Court stated that 
" ' [r jat ional interpretation requires at least a preliminary consideration of all 
credible evidence offered to prove the intention of the p a r t i e s . . / " Id, at 268 
(citation omitted). Further, extrinsic evidence is admissible "if the meaning 
of the contract is ambiguous or uncertain." Id. The Utah Supreme Court 
has directed that the reasonableness of the duration of Dr. Hardy's contract 
be determined. Inasmuch as it is proper to use extrinsic evidence to do so, 
the jury must make this determination. 
B. Reasonableness of Dura t ion is a Question of Fact for the 
J u r y to De te rmine , 
Even if extrinsic evidence is not admissible, it is a well-settled 
contract law principle that the jury evaluates reasonableness of duration. In 
Stutzke v. D.G.C. Liquidation Co., 533 So.2d 897 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), 
the Florida Court of Appeals held that "determination of what is a 
reasonable time is for the jury to make." Id, at 899; see also Burger Chef 
SysL, Inc. v. Burger Chef of Fla., Inc., 317 So.2d 795, 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1975)(holding that a jury evaluates what is a reasonable time for 
contract duration). In Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 526 A.2d 1192 (Pa. 
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Super. Ct. 1987) the Court carefully analyzed the evolution of employment 
law and its treatment of lifetime contracts. In that case, the employee 
claimed that he entered into a lifetime contract in exchange for accepting 
pay at a rate below union scale. The Trial Court found that the employee 
worked at a lower pay in exchange for a promise that he would not be laid 
off, not in exchange for a lifetime contract. The appellate court disagreed 
with this ruling and held that "[t]his a factual issue which must be submitted 
to a jury." Id. at 1202. The Court went on to state that "[t]he court must 
allow the jury to consider...the circumstances surrounding the agreement." 
Id. 
The only time that a determination of reasonableness could even 
remotely be considered a question of law for the court is where the '"...facts 
are undisputed and not fairly susceptible of divergent inferences.7n 
AMFAC, Inc. v. Waikiki Beachcomber Inv. Co., 839 P.2d 10, 24 (Haw. 
1992). The evidence in this case is not clear or decisive. At a minimum, 
reasonable minds could differ as to whether the contract duration set forth in 
Dr. Hardy's contract is reasonable. 
Several factors suggest that the "just cause" provision is reasonable. 
First, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that an indefinite duration does 
not necessarily result in an unreasonable contract. Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 
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92 at if 17. Second, UBMC drafted the contract provision at issue. During 
negotiations to attract Dr. Hardy to the hospital, UBMC used its existing 
contract with its previous pathologist, Dr. Sannella, as the template for its 
contract offer to Dr. Hardy. While this contract may or may not have been 
unusual when compared to other fields of specialty, UBMC clearly had a 
precedent for this type of arrangement with its pathologist. 
In addition, UBMC admits that a similar indefinite contract terminable 
for cause was entered into with Dr. Stewart who is a radiologist. This is 
important to the reasonableness determination because both pathologists and 
radiologists are hospital-based practitioners. In other words, they are 
unique because they rely on other doctors for their practice—they do not 
bring in their own patients. So, while patient-based doctors may have been 
negotiating contracts with terms for one year to five years, the doctors who 
have hospital-based practices are different. 
UBMC also admits that in addition to utilizing "just cause" contracts 
to attract hospital-based doctors, it has utilized "just cause" contracts for 
other physicians when it was difficult to attract physicians to its hospital 
with limited terms. (R. 1415). That is the function of the open market 
facing UBMC when it contracts under its proprietary function. Negotiations 
and market forces require different results in different conditions, and at 
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different times. UBMC should not be allowed to change the terms of that 
negotiation now that some time has passed and it thinks it can get a better 
Throughout the history of this litigation, UBMC has emphasized the 
language that the contract, as drafted and signed by the parties, "meets the 
needs of Uintah Basin Medical Center at this time." (R. 1601). The time of 
contracting is the only time period that matters, and a jury should decide, 
based on the facts, whether the duration of Dr. Hardy's contract was 
reasonable when made.1 Inasmuch as there is currently no Utah case law 
addressing this aspect of a ju ry ' s duty, and, because contract interpretation 
is a mixed question of law and fact, this Court should definitively determine 
whether reasonableness of duration is a question of fact for the jury or the 
judge. Dr. Hardy believes that the law is clear, this is a question of fact 
reserved for the jury. 
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 See Salt Lake City v. State, 448 P.2d 350, 354 (Utah 1968)(noting that "a 
city has no more right to repudiate its contracts than has a private person," 
and rebuking the city because, having gained the benefit of the bargain 
made, it "hopes to find a loophole by which it can escape from its duty" 
under the same contract); Bair v. Layton City Corp., 307 P.2d 895, 902-03 
(Utah 1957)(noting that the measurement for reasonableness is not after 
time has passed, but determined at the time the contract was entered into, 
and if the necessities of the situation at that time called for such a contract, 
then it is reasonable). 
See generally Consolidated Wagon & Mach. Co. v. Wright, 190 P. 937, 
939 (Utah 1920). 
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IV. THERE IS A GENUINE DISPUTE AS TO WHETHER UBMC 
HAD JUST CAUSE TO TERMINATE THE AGREEMENT AND 
THIS QUESTION MUST BE RESERVED FOR THE JURY. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that "Dr. Hardy's indefinite-length 
contract is terminable for 'just cause'5' Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 92 at ^[22. 
The Trial Court has already ruled that the jury should decide whether 
UBMC had "just cause" to terminate Dr. Hardy. (R. 737 & 1055). At an 
absolute minimum, the evidence uncovered thus far demonstrates that there 
is a genuine factual dispute over whether UBMC had legitimate business 
reasons for terminating Dr. Hardy and hiring Dr. Allred, or whether 
UBMC's alleged business reasons are an after-the-fact attempt to fabricate 
"just cause." Some of the evidence creating a genuine issue of fact 
includes: 
• Testimony from Dr. Wayne Stewart, a member of the UBMC 
Board of Trustees, that he never discussed with anyone at 
UBMC the hospital's need for an on-site pathologist until Dr. 
Allred began inquiring about the pathology position at UBMC. 
(R. 603-05). 
• Testimony from Dr. Elizabeth Hammond, Dr. Hardy's expert on 
pathology and hospital hiring procedures for pathologists, that 
UBMC did not adequately investigate Dr. Allred's credentials 
before hiring him. (R. 599-602). 
• Minutes from the UBMC Board of Trustees which do not reflect 
any discussion of a need at UBMC for an on-site pathologist. 
(R. 583-92). 
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• Ray Hussey's testimony that UBMC conducted no investigation 
of the financial impact of hiring Dr. Allred. (R. 596-98) 
• Brad LeBaron 's testimony that UBMC never contacted a single 
pathologist who ever worked with Dr. Allred. (R. 594-95). 
• There is no evidence that UBMC conducted any economic 
analysis or legitimate inquiry as to the financial or economic 
advantages of hiring Dr. Allred. Nor did UBMC list any 
business reasons when it decided to terminate Dr. Hardy. (R. 
1471, 1474, & 1490). 
• Brad LeBaron 's testimony that UBMC had substantial and 
reoccurring problems with Dr. Allred's turn around time, and 
that there were patient complaints from the emergency room 
about Dr. Allred. (R. 1531). 
• Dr. Allred is no longer working at UBMC and has left the State 
of Utah. 
There are also other compelling facts which suggest that UBMC did not 
have "just cause" to terminate Dr. Hardy, including, most importantly, the 
fact that there were never any complaints made against Dr. Hardy during his 
employment. 
Dr. Hardy has a right to have a jury weigh the facts set forth above, 
and others, to determine whether UBMC had "just cause" to terminate his 
employment. Reasonable minds could differ as to this determination and, 
therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate. 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
The Trial Court abdicated its duty in the summary judgment 
proceedings by not construing the evidence presented to it in the light most 
favorable to Dr. Hardy as the non-moving party. Dr. Hardy has presented 
more than enough evidence, even without developing the record as directed 
by the Utah Supreme Court, on which reasonable minds can differ and find 
in his favor. Further, the Court infringed on the ju ry ' s role in this matter 
which is to determine whether the duration of Dr. Hardy ' s contract is 
reasonable and whether UBMC had "just cause" to terminate Dr. Hardy. 
The Utah Supreme Court remanded this case to the Trial Court so that the 
Trial Court could determine the scope of the "just cause" provision and that 
is all. The Utah Supreme Court even went so far as to suggest how the Trial 
Court could go about making this decision, and clearly set forth its own 
interpretation of U B M C s bylaws which suggest that the scope of the "just 
cause" provision is broad. 
Although contract interpretation is a mixed question of law and fact, 
there is compelling case law in other states holding that reasonableness of 
duration is a question of fact for the jury to decide. This makes sense 
because a jury should weigh the factors that went into the decision to make 
Dr. Hardy's contract terminable only for "just cause." The Trial Court, in 
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overstepping its duty, completely disregarded the evidence presented to it 
regarding why UBMC and Dr. Hardy contracted as they did. Inasmuch as 
Utah law has not squarely addressed this issue, this Court should determine 
whether the jury is, in fact, entitled to determine reasonableness of duration. 
Finally, whether or not UBMC had just cause to terminate Dr. Hardy 
is clearly a question of fact for the jury. The Trial Court held this 
previously and nothing has changed in this case to reverse that decision. 
The facts in this case show that there is a genuine issue of material fact on 
which reasonable minds could differ. Accordingly, this Court should enter 
an order reversing the Trial Court's ruling granting summary judgment in 
favor of UBMC. 
DATED this _ ^ £ ^ d a y of March, 2004. 
Holland & Hart LLP 
John P. Harrington 
Jennifer L. Lange 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
Leo W. Hardy, M.D. 
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Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court's March 22, 2005 
Order and the Utah Court of Appeals March 3, 2005 decision and remand of the above-captioned 
case, Uintah Basin Medical Center ("UBMC") submits this Brief and asks this Court to dismiss 
Dr. Hardy's claims. 
BACKGROUND 
This case involves a dispute over UBMC's termination of a contract with Dr. Hardy. The 
case has been the subject of extensive discovery, multiple summary judgment motions, and two 
trips to the appellate courts. Given the long history of this case, UBMC does not believe it is 
necessary to repeat the procedural and factual history of this case from the beginning. Rather, 
UBMC believes it is more practical to focus on the history from the filing of the latest summary 
judgment forward. 
On March 17, 2003, UBMC filed a summary judgment motion with this Court. UBMC's 
summary judgment motion basically stated that, under legal standards established in the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in this matter, Dr. Hardy could not prevail on any of his claims 
because either (1) the "just cause" provision could be narrowly interpreted (Dr. Hardy's 
interpretation) and Dr. Hardy's contract was void because the durational period (the "just cause" 
provision) was too restrictive or (2) the "just cause" provision could be interpreted more broadly 
(UBMC's interpretation) and Dr. Hardy had no claim because UBMC acted within that broad 
discretion. 
Dr. Hardy opposed the summary judgment motion, arguing that UBMC's discretion was 
not as narrow as Dr. Hardy's previous statements suggested and was not as broad as UBMC 
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believed it to be. Additionally, Dr. Hardy argued that UBMC could not terminate the contract 
for "legitimate business reasons." 
This Court reviewed both parties' positions and heard oral argument. Given Dr. Hardy's 
uncontro verted statements and the unusual nature of Dr. Hardy's contract in comparison to other 
UBMC contracts (a comparison required by the Supreme Court's decision), this Court granted 
UBMC's summary judgment on the first argument. 
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Dr. Hardy's contract is not ambiguous and 
that the Court would apply the "ordinary" meaning of the term "just cause." The Court of 
Appeals rejected Dr. Hardy's narrow interpretation of "just cause" and adopted a definition of 
"just cause" similar to that advocated by UBMC from the beginning of this dispute. 
The Court of Appeals stated that the "ordinary" meaning of the term "just cause" is 
understood "to provide employers with the power to terminate an employee for legitimate 
business reasons and in the interest of improving client services as long as the justification is not 
a mere pretext for a capricious, bad faith, or illegal termination." UBMC v. Hardy, 520 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 22, 24 (Ut. Ct. App. 2005). For the Court's convenience, a copy of the Court of 
Appeal's opinion is attached as Exhibit A. The Court of Appeals then remanded the case back to 
this Court to determine the only remaining issue: whether the Board terminated Dr. Hardy for 
"just cause" as broadly defined by the Court of Appeals. Id. at 25. 
In its own review of the record and Dr. Hardy's arguments, the Court of Appeals found 
nothing that would indicate UBMC violated the "just cause" provision of Dr. Hardy's contract. 
The Court of Appeals stated that its "search of the trial record does not indicate that Dr. Hardy 
3 
#184718 vl 
has, in the course of these proceedings, identified any acts, or even a motive, to show that the 
Board's decision was compelled by non-business reasons constituting caprice, bad faith or 
illegality." Id, at 26 fh. 5 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals review included all of the 
arguments in Section IV (pages 37 and 38) of Dr. Hardy's recent appellate brief, including those 
asserting UBMC's alleged lack of need of a full-time pathologist, UBMC's alleged insufficient 
investigation of Dr. Allred's credentials, UBMC's alleged insufficient analysis of the financial 
impact of terminating Dr. Hardy's services and replacing him with Dr. Allred, and issues 
regarding Dr. Allred's performance at UBMC. 
As indicated by the Court of Appeals, it is up to this Court to determine whether further 
proceedings are warranted. Id. at 25. As set forth below, the proper procedure is to confirm the 
Court of Appeals finding that there is no evidence in the record and no dispute of material fact 
that UBMC exercised good faith and had legitimate business reasons to terminate the contract. 
UBMC is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No genuine issue of material fact remains in this case, in part because both parties have 
stipulated to many of the relevant facts. See Joint Stipulation of Facts, September 29, 1999 
("Stipulated Facts"), which are attached as Exhibit B. Also, in light of the Court of Appeals' 
opinion, the only "material" facts in this case are the statements made by UBMC articulating its 
reasons for terminating Dr. Hardy's contract, all of which are undisputed. 
Any extrinsic evidence about the intent of the parties in entering into the Agreement is 
now immaterial since the Court of Appeals held that the contract's "just cause" provision is 
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"unambiguous." UBMC v. Hardy, 520 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24. Any facts about Dr. Alfred's 
performance as a pathologist at UBMC or whether the Board's desire to improve service and 
patient care were actually realized are also immaterial since the Court of Appeals held that 
"UBMC need not prove that the Board's assumptions in terminating Dr. Hardy were true or that 
the benefits were actually realized." Id. at 25. 
The Court of Appeals made two key holdings: (l)"we remand for the trial court to 
determine whether the Board terminated Dr. Hardy for legitimate business reasons or whether 
the termination was capricious, in bad faith, and illegal" and (2) UBMC need only show that the 
Board "acted in good faith by adequately considering the facts it reasonably believed to be true at 
the time it made the decision." Id. Therefore, the only material facts relating to this Court's 
decision are those related to UBMC's understanding and motives when terminating Dr. Hardy's 
contract. Id. The undisputed facts supporting UBMC's good faith decision to terminate the 
contract are: 
A. In November of 1994, UBMC and Dr. Hardy entered into an Agreement 
under which Dr. Hardy was to supply pathology services to UBMC on a part-time, mostly off-
site basis (the "Agreement"). Stipulated Facts, [^3, attached as Exhibit B. 
B. The Agreement states that it may be terminated for "just cause." A copy 
of the Agreement dated November 29, 1994 ("Agreement") is attached as Exhibit C. 
C. For approximately two years thereafter, Dr. Hardy provided on-site 
services to UBMC for an average of about eight hours per month. Stipulated Facts, ^ 10, Exhibit 
B. 
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D. The UBMC Board of Trustees ("the Board") is the entity authorized to 
terminate Dr. Hardy's contract. Stipulated Facts, f 5, Exhibit B. 
E. In July of 1996, UBMC determined that the health, welfare, and interests 
of the citizens of Duchesne County would be better served by terminating Dr. Hardy's contract. 
Affidavit of Bradley D. LeBaron, July 10, 1998 ("LeBaron Aff"), attached hereto as Exhibit D; 
Deposition of Brad LeBaron, March 24, 1999 ("LeBaron Depo."), pg. 39 In. 8 to In. 24, pg. 62 
In. 1 to In. 9, pg. 95 In. 2 to In. 25, attached as Exhibit E; Deposition of Gordon Snow, June 9, 
1999 ("Snow Depo."), pg 24 In. 6 to In. 13, pg. 43 In. 12 to In. 24, attached as Exhibit F; July 18, 
1996 UBMC Board of Trustee Meeting Minutes, attached as Exhibit G. 
F. In particular, UBMC terminated Dr. Hardy's contract for "just cause" 
because it believed a full-time, on-site pathologist living in the same community and with a 
laboratory in the hospital would better serve the needs of the hospital and community than a part-
time, visiting pathologist with a laboratory in another city. LeBaron Depo., pg. 52, In. 21 to pg. 
53, In. 6.; pg. 59 Ins. 8-16, Exhibit E; Snow Depo., pg. 26 Ins. 9 to 21, pg. 43 In. 12 to In. 24, pg. 
47 Ins. 5 to 16, Exhibit F; Le Baron Aff., fs 4-6, Exhibit D. 
G. UBMC doctors, including Dr. Wayne Stewart, also saw a need for 
additional pathology services. Deposition of Dr. Wayne Stewart, July 29, 1999, ("Stewart 
Depo.") pg 34 In. 17 to pg. 36 In. 14, attached as Exhibit H; July 11, 1996 UBMC Medical Staff 
Meeting Minutes, attached as Exhibit I. In particular, Dr. Stewart, also a UBMC Board member, 
believed that some UBMC patients may have went to other health care facilities to receive 
pathology services on a more timely basis. Stewart Depo., pg. 26 In. 18 to pg. 27 In. 5; pg. 31 In. 
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11 to pg. 33 In. 25, Exhibit H. Dr. Stewart also testified that having a pathologist available to 
work with the radiologist improved patient care by reducing the risk of bleeding in some 
circumstances and by allowing the radiologist and pathologist to jointly educate one another. 
Stewart Depo., pg. 29 In. 5 to pg. 31 In. 5, Exhibit H. 
H. UBMC also terminated Dr. Hardy's contract for "just cause" because it 
believed a pathologist who could also perform emergency medicine would better serve the needs 
of the hospital and community than a part-time pathologist who was not qualified to assist with 
UBMC's emergency medicine needs. LeBaron Depo., pg. 41 In. 18 to pg 42 In. 10, pg. 52 In. 21 
to pg. 53 In. 6, Exhibit E; Snow Depo., pg. 43 In. 12 to In. 24, Exhibit F; LeBaron Aff., «| 4-6, 
Exhibit D. At the time, UBMC was constantly in need of additional physicians in the emergency 
room. LeBaron Depo., pg. 41 In. 18 to 24, Exhibit E. 
I. UBMC sent a letter dated July 29, 1996 to Dr. Hardy providing written 
notice of its decision to terminate the Agreement. Stipulated Facts, ^ 8, Exhibit B. 
J. UBMC checked Dr. Allred's references prior to terminating Dr. Hardy's 
contract, including many of the "consumers" of his services. LeBaron Depo. pg. 46 In. 11 to pg. 
48 In. 9, pg. 107 In. 13 to pg.l 10 In. 10, Exhibit E; Snow Depo., pg. 31 In. 16 to pg. 33 In. 24, 
Exhibit F. These references provided very favorable information regarding Dr. Allred. Id. The 
Board specifically found that the references it received regarding Dr. Allred were "highly 
complementary" regarding his "capabilities and character." July 18, 1996, UBMC Board of 
Trustee Meeting Minutes, Exhibit G. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. The Board satisfied the "just cause" provision of Dr. Hardy's contract 
because Dr. Hardy's contract was terminated for "legitimate business reasons." 
As stated by the Court of Appeals, the only remaining issue in this case is whether or not 
UBMC discharged Dr. Hardy based on legitimate business reasons. UBMC v. Hardy, 520 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 25. As the undisputed facts and the law prove, UBMC discharged Dr. Hardy for 
legitimate business reasons and Dr. Hardy's claims should be dismissed with prejudice. 
Just cause is "ordinarily understood to provide employers with power to terminate an 
employee for legitimate business reasons and in the interest of improving client services as long 
as the justification is not a mere pretext for a capricious, bad faith, or illegal termination." Id. at 
24. The Court of Appeals held that if UBMC terminated Dr. Hardy for legitimate business 
reasons, and not for capricious, illegal, or bad faith reasons, then UBMC's termination was 
lawful and Dr. Hardy's claims are baseless. Id. at 25 ("The "just cause" term provided the 
Board with discretion to terminate Dr. Hardy for good faith business reasons . . . . we remand for 
the trial court to determine whether the Board terminated Dr. Hardy for legitimate business 
reasons or whether the termination was capricious, in bad faith, or illegal."). 
Specific to this Court's analysis on remand and UBMC's related burden, the Court of 
Appeals held that "UBMC need not prove that the Board's assumptions in terminating Dr. Hardy 
were true or that the benefits it expected were actually realized. Rather, UBMC need only show 
the Board acted in good faith by adequately considering the facts it reasonably believed to be 
true at the time it made the decision." Id. at 25. As demonstrated below and as the Court of 
#184718 vl 
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Appeals found when it reviewed the record before it, UBMC and its Board acted in good faith 
based upon the information available at the time it terminated Dr. Hardy's contract. 
When the Board terminated Dr. Hardy's contract in July of 1996, the Board determined 
that the health, welfare, and interests of the citizens of Duchesne County would be better served 
by terminating Dr. Hardy's contract. Statement of Fact E. The Board's decision was based upon 
facts that it believed in good faith to be true at the time. First and foremost, the Board believed 
that the needs of the hospital and community would be better met if Dr. Hardy's contract for 
part-time pathology services by a visiting doctor was terminated and the Board hired a full-time, 
on-site pathologist who would live in the same community and have a laboratory in the hospital. 
Statement of Fact F. 
UBMC's belief that additional pathology services would be beneficial to the hospital was 
"reasonable" given the available facts. For example, some UBMC doctors, including Board 
member Dr. Wayne Stewart, saw a need for additional pathology services at the time and 
communicated that need to the hospital administrator. Statement of Fact G. In particular, Dr. 
Stewart believed that some UBMC patients may have went to other health care facilities to 
receive pathology services on a more timely basis. Id. 
The Board also terminated Dr. Hardy's contract because the Board reasonably believed a 
pathologist who could also perform emergency medicine would better serve the needs of the 
hospital and community than a part-time pathologist who was not qualified to assist with 
UBMC's emergency medicine needs. Statement of Fact H. All of the foregoing reasons given 
by the Board to terminate Dr. Hardy's contract are "legitimate business reasons" satisfying the 
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"just cause" provision of Dr. Hardy's contract (as defined by the Court of Appeals). Therefore, 
the Board terminated Dr. Hardy's coa&act for'"just cause," Dr. Hardy's claims should be 
dismissed, and a declaratory judgment should be entered in favor of UBMC. 
B. The Board had "just cause" to terminate Dr. Hardy's contract because it did 
not act with caprice, bad faith, or illegality. 
"The just cause term provided the Board with discretion to terminate Dr. Hardy for good 
faith business reasons . . . . we remand for the trial court to determine whether the Board 
terminated Dr. Hardy for legitimate business reasons or whether the termination was capricious, 
in bad faith, or illegal." UBMC v. Hardy, 520 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25. "Caprice" is defined by 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, pg. 145, (Abridged 6th Ed. 1991), as "whim, arbitrary, seemingly 
unfounded motivation." Utah courts have found that "arbitrary and capricious" means no more 
than a "decision[] must fall within the limits of reasonableness and rationality." Hilte v. 
Industrial Comm yn of Utah, 766 P.2d 1089 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). "Bad faith" is defined in 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, pg. 94, (Abridged 6th Ed. 1991), as "not simply bad judgment or 
negligence, but rather it implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of a dishonest purpose 
or moral obliquity. . . [and] contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive 
design or ill will." Illegal generally means to be against or unauthorized by the law. 
UBMC and its Board did not act "capriciously" in terminating Dr. Hardy's contract 
because UBMC's decision was founded upon the Board's reasonable beliefs and expectations of 
improving the hospital and the care provided. Statement of Fact F. Also, UBMC's decision to 
#184718 vl 
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terminate Dr. Hardy's contract to improve pathology and emergency medicine services certainly 
falls with "the limits of reasonableness and rationality." Statements of Fact G andH. 
Each of Dr. Hardy's arguments about UBMC's alleged lack of "just cause" have been 
rejected by the Court of Appeals, are irrelevant, and would not support a finding of capricious, 
bad faith or illegal activity by UBMC. For example, Dr. Hardy's claim that Dr. Stewart did not 
discuss UBMC's need for an on-site pathologist until Dr. Allred inquired about a position or Dr. 
Hardy's claim that the Board's minutes do not reflect a need for an on-site pathologist (page 37 
of Dr. Hardy's Appellate Brief) are irrelevant and immaterial. The undisputed facts clearly show 
that Dr. Stewart believed that an on-site pathologist would be beneficial to UBMC and that Dr. 
Stewart shared this information with UBMC's administrator before Dr. Hardy's contract was 
terminated. Statement of Fact G Moreover, while the Board's minutes do not specifically state 
a need for an on-site pathologist, the testimony of the Board members clearly demonstrates that 
they believed at the time the decision was made to terminate Dr. Hardy's contract that an on-site 
pathologist would better serve the needs of the hospital and community. Statement of Fact F. 
UBMC had the information it needed about pathology services (and emergency medicine 
services, a point ignored by Dr. Hardy) at the time it made its decision about Dr. Hardy's 
contract. 
Dr. Hardy also complains about the process of hiring Dr. Hardy's replacement, alleging 
that "UBMC never contacted a single pathologist who ever worked with Dr. Allred" and that, 
according to Dr. Hardy's expert, UBMC "did not adequately investigate Dr. Allred's credentials 
before hiring him." Dr. Hardy's Appellate Brief, pgs. 37 and 38. This argument is a red herring. 
11 
#184718 vl 
UBMC checked Dr. Allred's references prior to terminating Dr. Hardy's contract, including 
many of the former "consumers" of his services. Statement of Fact J. The references received 
by UBMC were very favorable and supported hiring Dr. Allred. Statement of Fact J, The Board 
specifically found that the references it received regarding Dr. Allred were "highly 
complementary" regarding his "capabilities and character." UBMC's reference check of Dr. 
Allred is sufficient to show that UBMC acted with "good faith" and "adequately considered the 
facts it reasonably believed to be true at the time it made the decision." UBMC v. Hardy, 520 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 25. 
Dr. Hardy's complaint that UBMC did not conduct an investigation of the financial or 
economic impact of hiring Dr. Allred is another red herring. UBMC never stated that it was 
hiring Dr. Allred to improve its financial situation. Rather, UBMC has consistently stated from 
the beginning of this dispute that it terminated Dr. Hardy and hired Dr. Allred for legitimate 
business reasons, namely improving patient care by increasing coverage in the emergency room 
and having an on-site pathologist with a laboratory at the hospital. Statements of Fact F, G, and 
H. Dr. Hardy's argument about "financial and economic investigations" is nothing more than a 
transparent attempt to find fault with UBMC's legitimate business reasons for terminating Dr. 
Hardy's contract. 
Finally, Dr. Hardy's complaints about Dr. Allred's performance at UBMC (Dr. Hardy's 
Appellate Brief, pg. 38) also are irrelevant. The Court of Appeals specifically stated that 
"UBMC need not prove that the Board's assumptions in terminating Dr. Hardy were true or that 
the benefits were actually realized." Id. at 25. 
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The Court of Appeals reviewed and rejected each and everyone of Dr. Hardy's arguments 
about UBMC's lack of "just cause." Regarding these arguments (which were specifically 
included in Dr. Hardy's appellate brief) and others found in the Court of Appeals' search of the 
trial record, the Court of Appeals decision states that Dr. Hardy has failed to identify "any acts, 
or even a motive, to show that the Board's decision was compelled by non-business reasons 
constituting caprice, bad faith or illegality." Id. at 26 fn.5. Therefore, the Board had "just cause" 
to terminate Dr. Hardy's contract because it did not act capriciously, with bad faith, or illegally 
in terminating the contract. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the legal standards set forth in the Court of Appeals recent decision, UBMC 
had "just cause" to terminate Dr. Hardy's contract. Therefore, a declaratory judgment should be 
entered for UBMC stating that its termination of Dr. Hardy's contract was legal and proper. All 
of Dr. Hardy's claims should be dismissed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jCl day of April, 2005. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
E. Blaine R^vson 
Blaine J. Benard 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Provo, Utah 
complaint raises a legitimate factual question as to 
whether Plaintiffs should have known of the facts 
underlying their causes of action within the 
limitations period. As a result, the determination of 
whether Plaintiffs should be charged with 
constructive notice of their causes of action within 
the relevant four-year statute of limitations, and if so, 
whether, given that knowledge, Plaintiffs acted 
reasonably in failing to file their complaint within 
the limitations period are questions appropriately 
reserved for the fact-finder. 
^[46 For these reasons, we affirm the court of 
appeals' decision and remand to the district court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
TJ47 Chief Justice Durham, Justice Parrish, 
Justice Nehring, and Judge Dawson concur in Justice 
Durrant's opinion. 
1)48 Having disqualified himself, Associate Chief 
Justice Wilkins does not participate herein, District 
Court Judge Glen A. Dawson sat. 
1 CMT was not incorporated as a legal corporation in 
California until December 5, 1996. Additionally, CMT has 
never registered to do business in the State of Utah. 
2 Plaintiffs believe "Charles Perez" is affiliated with CMT 
although they do not know the exact nature of this affiliation. 
3 The court of appeals also concluded that the district court 
erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' fraud claim, Russell/Packard, 
2003 UT App 316 atf l28 n . l l , 31, and Plaintiffs' breach of 
fiduciary duty claim against Bustos, id. at 1(35. These holdings 
are not before us; therefore, we do not address them. 
We do observe, however, that Plaintiffs' counsel conceded 
during oral argument before the court of appeals that Plaintiffs' 
commercial bribery claim was properly dismissed. Because 
the parties agree that the court of appeals erred in failing to 
dismiss this claim, we dismiss the Plaintiffs' commercial 
bribery claim. 
4 The concealment version of the discovery rule will be 
discussed in detail later in our opinion. See infra 1fl)25-31. 
5 As addressed more fully herein, an "internal discovery rule" 
refers to a discovery rule that is contained within and therefore 
mandated by the statute of limitations itself. See infra <pl. 
6 We acknowledge that, under the concealment version of the 
discovery rule, a defendant may, as a practical matter, 
effectively shorten the limitations period available to a plaintiff 
by concealing a plaintiffs cause of action during part, or all, of 
the statutory period. This rule may appear inequitable at first 
glance, especially when juxtaposed with the operation of a 
statutory discovery rule, such as that contained under the 
three-year statute of limitations used in our illustration above. 
See supra Tf23; Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(3). However, a 
plaintiff will be prohibited from successfully raising the 
concealment version of the discovery rule only in situations 
where the plaintiff has acted unreasonably, i.e., where the 
plaintiff has failed to file a complaint before the limitations 
period expired and a reasonable plaintiff would necessarily 
have done so. 
7 After explaining in Berenda that inquiry notice operates 
differently "when a plaintiff alleges that a defendant took 
affirmative steps to conceal the plaintiffs cause of action," we 
went on to state that, "[i]n such a situation, the plaintiff can 
avoid the full operation of the discovery rule by making a 
prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment and then 
demonstrating that, given the defendant's actions, a reasonable 
plaintiff would not have discovered the claim earlier." 914 
P.2d at 51. The latter part of this quoted language is 
admittedly confusing, and has been misinterpreted as 
articulating an analytical standard under which the 
concealment version of the discovery rule will operate to toll 
a statute of limitations. See, e.g., Russell/Packard, 2003 UT 
App 316 at f l 5 . This is incorrect. We clarify that the 
above-quoted language in Berenda stands only for the 
principle that, where a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing 
of fraudulent concealment on the part of the defendant, inquiry 
notice operates differently depending on whether a statutory or 
an equitable discovery rule applies. In other words, in cases of 
fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff will not automatically be 
charged with constructive notice of a claim simply by virtue of 
being on inquiry notice of it. See Berenda, 914 P.2d at 52-53; 
see also Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT 16, fl 16-21, 28 P.3d 1271 
(applying the Berenda inquiry notice standard to evaluate 
when the plaintiff discovered her cause of action and thereby 
triggered the running of a statute of limitations). 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
1[1 Dr. Leo W. Hardy appeals the trial court's order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Uintah Basin 
Medical Center (UBMC) in a suit regarding UBMCs 
termination of his employment agreement. We 
reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
T[2 Dr. Hardy is a board-certified pathologist. On 
November 29, 1994, he executed an employment 
agreement (the Agreement) to provide pathology 
services for UBMC, which is owned by Duchesne 
County and operated by the UBMC Board of 
Trustees (Board). Under the Agreement, which 
consists of only two pages taken almost verbatim 
from that of Dr. Hardy's predecessor, UBMC was to 
refer certain types of laboratory work to Dr. Hardy 
and pay a $400 monthly laboratory director's fee. In 
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return, Dr. Hardy would work as the director of 
UBMC's laboratory and provide related services, 
which included weekly visits to the hospital. The 
Agreement does not include a fixed termination date; 
rather, it would "continue to bind parties . . . until 
terminated after ninety (90) days written notice for 
just cause of termination by either party or by mutual 
consent of the parties to a shorter notice period." The 
Agreement does not define "just cause" or otherwise 
clarify what grounds would justify termination. 
P On July 29, 1996, UBMC sent Dr. Hardy notice 
of termination and later hired Dr. Thomas Allred in 
his place. On October 28, 1996, UBMC brought a 
suit for declaratory judgment to establish that its 
termination of the Agreement with Dr. Hardy was for 
"just cause." Dr. Hardy filed a counterclaim alleging 
that the termination was without "just cause" and a 
breach of contract. Following discovery, the trial 
court granted UBMC's motion for summary 
judgment. The court determined that the Board in 
place at the time Dr. Hardy was hired had, during the 
course of Dr. Hardy's employment, been replaced by 
a successor Board and that the successor Board was 
no longer bound by the Agreement. 
1[4 Dr. Hardy appealed the order to the Utah 
Supreme Court, which reversed. The court explained, 
in essence, that a contract is binding upon a 
successor governmental board as long the contract (1) 
involves a non governmental "proprietary power or 
function" and (2) is for "a reasonable duration." 
Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy, 2002 UT 92,1)11, 
54 P.3d 1165. The court determined that the 
Agreement involved a proprietary function and not a 
government power, see id. at 1J16, but remanded "to 
allow further development of the record" with respect 
to the reasonableness of the Agreement's duration, id. 
at 1(18. In gauging the reasonableness of the 
Agreement, the court instructed the trial court to 
consider how the "just cause" provision was 
understood by the parties. Specifically, the court 
suggested that the trial court should consider: (a) 
whether "the 'just cause' provision gives successor 
boards broad discretion to terminate Dr. Hardy," in 
which case the duration would likely be reasonable, 
or whether "the 'just cause' provision permitted 
termination only for deficient job performance," in 
which case the duration would likely be 
unreasonable; and (b) "[t]he extent to which the 
durational limitations in Dr. Hardy's contract conform 
to UBMC's usual practices in similar situations." Id. 
T|5 On remand, UBMC again moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that there were no factual disputes 
and that the duration of Dr. Hardy's agreement was 
unreasonable as a matter of law. UBMC relied on 
statements in Dr. Hardy's deposition testimony that 
the Agreement could not be terminated except for 
deficient job performance or physical incapacity. 
UBMC also emphasized that it had only rarely used 
the "just cause" provision in its employment 
contracts with physicians. In response, Dr. Hardy 
submitted a post-remand affidavit explaining that he 
understood that "just cause" permitted UBMC boards 
to terminate the Agreement under a variety of 
circumstances, which included deficient 
performance, physical incapacity, and fundamental 
changes in the hospital's need for pathology services. 
Dr. Hardy also argued that although UBMC's use of 
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the "just cause" provision had been erratic, UBMC 
had included the same clause in its 1992 contract 
with Dr. Joseph J. Sannella, the pathology physician 
immediately preceding him. 
1)6 The trial court agreed with UBMC and granted 
its motion for summary judgment. In its June 19, 
2003 ruling, the court explained that Dr. Hardy's 
understanding of the "just cause" provision as 
described in his original deposition was too limiting 
because "he could only be terminated for a few 
specific reasons, including death, physical incapacity, 
or if the hospital no longer required pathology 
services." The court went on to conclude that Dr. 
Hardy's post-remand affidavit clarifying his position 
was invalid under the "sham affidavit" rule because 
it contradicted his deposition testimony and served as 
an "attempt[] to re-draft his interpretation of the just 
cause clause to more similarly mirror the higher 
Court's opinion." Finally, the court also noted that the 
majority of UBMC's contracts contained a specific 
time limitation or a clause to terminate with proper 
notice. Thus, in the court's opinion, Dr. Hardy's 
contract indicated a significant departure from 
UBMC's normal practices. 
f7 Dr. Hardy appeals the trial court's order. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
T|8 On appeal, we must decide whether summary 
judgment was proper in this case. Specifically, we 
must determine (a) whether the trial court properly 
interpreted the "just cause" provision, (b) whether 
the Agreement is for a reasonable duration as a 
matter of law, and (c) whether any questions of fact 
justify remand to a finder of fact. We review a trial 
court's grant of summary judgment for correctness. 
See Speros v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69,1|20, 98 P.3d 28. 
"In reviewing summary judgments, we view the facts 
and all reasonable inferences drawn from them in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party," id., 
and affirm if we conclude that "there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law," 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
1J9 Similarly, "questions of contract interpretation 
not requiring resort to extrinsic evidence are matters 
of law, which we review for correctness." Fairbourn 
Commercial, Inc. v. American Hous. Partners, Inc., 
2004 UT 54,H6, 94 P.3d 292 (quotations and citation 
omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
L Interpretation of the "Just Cause" Provision 
1)10 The key question in this case is what the 
"just cause" provision in the Agreement means. Once 
this question is answered, we may gauge whether the 
Agreement was for a reasonable duration and also 
determine whether UBMC had just cause to 
terminate Dr. Hardy. 
\\ 1 To interpret the "just cause" provision, the 
trial court relied primarily on extrinsic evidence, 
namely Dr. Hardy's deposition testimony regarding 
his understanding of the term. Although this use of 
extrinsic evidence was urged by our supreme court, 
see Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy, 2002 UT 
92,1(18, 54 P.3d 1165, we note that such evidence 
must be considered only in the proper context and in 
accordance with well-settled principles of contract 
interpretation. 
K12 When parties to a contract disagree about the 
n??k 
meaning of a provision, principles of contract 
interpretation require us to give effect to the meaning 
intended by the parties at the time they entered into 
the agreement See Central Fla Invs, Inc v 
Parkwest Assocs , 2002 UT 3,1(12, 40 P 3d 599 ("In 
interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties 
are controlling ") A court may rely on extrinsic 
evidence of the parties' intent to interpret a provision, 
but it may do so only after it has determined that the 
provision is ambiguous See, e g, Nielsen v Gold's 
Gym, 2003 UT 37,1(6, 78 P 3d 600 Otherwise, when 
the agreement is unambiguous, the court must 
"determme[] the parties' intentions from the plain 
meaning of the contractual language as a matter of 
law " Fairbourn, 2004 UT 54 at 1(10 (quotations and 
citations omitted) 
1(13 The question of whether a contract is 
ambiguous is decided by the court as a matter of law 
See Wagner v Clifton, 2002 UT 109,1(12, 62 P 3d 
440 The court must first make a preliminary 
determination of ambiguity, and m doing so, may 
consider "[rjelevant, extrinsic evidence 'of the facts 
known to the parties at the time they entered the 
[contract]'" Nielsen, 2003 UT 37 at 1(7 (quoting 
Year gin, Inc v Auditing Div of Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 2001 UT 11,1(39, 20 P 3d 287) (second 
alteration m original) Generally, "[a] contract 
provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than 
one reasonable interpretation because of 'uncertain 
meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies'" Fairbourn, 2004 UT 54 at 1J10 
(citation omitted) However, '"[a] contract provision 
is not necessarily ambiguous just because one party 
gives that provision a different meaning than another 
party does To demonstrate ambiguity, the contrary 
positions of the parties must each be tenable'" 
Novell Inc v Canopy Group, Inc, 2004 UT App 
162,1(24, 92 P 3d 768 (quoting R & R Energies v 
Mother Earth Indus, Inc, 936 P 2d 1068, 1074 
(Utah 1997)) Thus, a contract term may be 
imprecise, but it is not ambiguous if persons of 
competent skill and knowledge are capable of 
understanding its plain meaning See R & R 
Energies, 936 P 2d at 1074 
1(14 Although both parties here have ascribed 
different meanings to the "just cause" provision, we 
cannot conclude that the term is ambiguous UBMC 
has taken the position that it has "just cause" to 
terminate Dr Hardy's employment when the business 
exigencies of the hospital and the interests of the 
patients warrant a change m personnel In contrast, 
Dr Hardy testified m his post-remand affidavit1 that 
he understood the "just cause" provision to allow 
UBMC to terminate the Agreement only under 
specific circumstances 
In essence, UBMC would have just cause to 
terminate my Agreement if I failed to 
perform or something substantial changed as 
to the need of UBMC for pathology services 
(e g, hospital closure) which may be caused 
by financial concerns Those financial 
concerns, however, could not include merely 
getting a lower price for the pathology 
services or histology lab supervision 
Hardy also asserts that he understood "just cause" to 
imply that 
[i]f UBMC perceived a need for changes in 
al Center v. Hardy code Co 
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scope or mar ner of the provided pathology 
services, I expected them to approach me 
regarding such a need, and if jointly agreed 
upon, I would have adjusted accordingly If I 
could not accommodate these changes, then 
UBMC would be free to terminate the 
Agreement 
1(15 Dr Hardy's interpretation is ultimately 
untenable for two reasons First, the evidence on 
record does not indicate that the parties understood 
the "just cause" provision to have a unique meaning 
particular to the Agreement, much less the detailed 
meaning understood by Dr Hardy The parties have 
stipulated that the Agreement is, for all practical 
purposes, identical to that of Dr Hardy's predecessor, 
Dr Joseph Sannella The "just cause" termination 
provision was copied from the Sannella contract and 
included in the Agreement without any substantial 
negotiation The parties did not incorporate other 
documents, such as the UBMC bylaws, to define 
when either party would have cause to terminate the 
Agreement Thus, we must conclude that any 
particular meaning of "just cause" as understood or 
intended by Dr Hardy is unique to himself and is, as 
he concedes in his brief, irrelevant to its 
interpretation 2 
K16 Second, Dr Hardy's interpretation of "just 
cause" is at odds with the ordinary meaning of the 
term Unlike an at-will employment agreement, 
which allows an employer to discharge an employee 
for any, or no, reason, see Hansen v America Online, 
Inc, 2004 UT 62,1(7, 96 P 3d 950, termination for 
just cause is widely understood to permit discharge 
only for "a fair and honest cause or reason, regulated 
by good faith as opposed to one that is trivial, 
capricious, unrelated to business needs or goals, or 
pretextual " Guz v Bechtel Nat% Inc , 8 P 3d 1089, 
1100 (Cal 2000) (quotations and citation omitted)3 
This broad definition of just cause allows an 
employer to discharge an employee not only for 
misconduct or poor performance but also for other 
legitimate economic reasons4 Courts have recognized 
that '"[i]n deciding whether [just] cause exists, there 
must be a balance between the employer's interest in 
operating its business efficiently and profitably and 
the employee's interest in continued employment 
Care must be exercised so as not to interfere with 
the employees legitimate exercise of managerial 
discretion "' Cotran v Rollins Hudig Hall Int'l, Inc , 
948 P 2d 412, 417 (Cal 1998) (citations omitted), 
see also 82 Am Jur 2d Wrongful Discharge §181 
("What constitutes good cause for dismissal of an 
employee is generally a matter for an employer's good 
business judgment ") 
1(17 In sum, absent evidence that the parties 
intended a meaning of "just cause" unique to this 
particular agreement, we must conclude that the 
parties intended the term to have its ordinary 
meaning Accordingly, we hold that the "just cause" 
provision is unambiguous and is ordinarily 
understood to provide employers with power to 
terminate an employee for legitimate business 
reasons and in the interest of improving client 
services as long as the justification is not a mere 
pretext for a capricious, bad faith, or illegal 
termination 
II. Reasonable Duration 
1118 The trial court determined that the 
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Agreement was void as a matter of law because its 
duration imposed an unreasonable restraint on the 
Board as a governmental body. However, having 
determined that the "just cause" permits termination 
for legitimate business reasons, we must also 
conclude that the Agreement was for a reasonable 
duration. As the supreme court indicated, "the 
reasonableness of the contract's duration depends in 
large part on the amount of discretion this provision 
gives to successor boards." Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. 
v. Hardy, 2002 UT 92,^18, 54 P.3d 1165. We also 
note that with regard to the reasonableness of a 
government contract, the supreme court in the past 
has adopted a relatively low threshold: 
If it be made to appear that at the time the 
contract was entered into, it was fair and just 
and reasonable, and prompted by the 
necessities of the situation, or was in its 
nature advantageous to the [governing body], 
then such contract will not be construed as an 
unreasonable restraint upon the powers of 
succeeding boards. 
Bair v. Layton City Corp., 6 Utah 2d 138, 307 P.2d 
895, 902-03 (Utah 1957) (quotations and citation 
omitted); see also Eugene McQuillin, The Law of 
Municipal Corporations §29.101 (3d ed. 1999) 
(M[T]he general rule seems to be that a contract of 
employment extending beyond the term of the office 
of the [governing body], is, if made in good faith, 
ordinarily a valid contract."). 
T[19 Here, the contract with Dr. Hardy did not 
impose a significant restraint on the Board. The "just 
cause" term provided the board with discretion to 
terminate Dr. Hardy for good faith business reasons 
and was, therefore, not binding in perpetuity. 
Moreover, although "just cause" term appeared in 
only a few of UBMC contracts, it was fair and 
beneficial to both parties at the time they entered into 
the Agreement because, on one hand, it provided the 
Board with considerable freedom to change the 
employment decisions of the predecessor boards, 
and, on the other hand, it guaranteed Dr. Hardy good 
faith employment. We cannot, therefore, conclude the 
Agreement imposed an unreasonable duration on the 
Board. 
III. UBMCs Just Cause to Terminate 
)^20 The only remaining issue is whether the 
Board discharged Dr. Hardy for just cause. Because 
the trial court did not reach this issue in its summary 
judgment ruling, we remand for the trial court to 
determine whether the Board terminated Dr. Hardy 
for legitimate business reasons or whether the 
termination was capricious, in bad faith, or illegal.5 
T[21 However, we address here the question of 
what an employer must show to prove it terminated 
an employee for just cause, a matter of first 
impression for Utah courts. There appear to be three 
different approaches to this question. Some courts 
seem to give deference to the justifications stated by 
the employer. See e.g., Gaudio v. Griffin Health 
Servs. Corp.,133A.2d 197,208(Conn. 1999)("[A]n 
employer who wishes to terminate an employee for 
cause must do nothing more rigorous than 'proffer a 
proper reason for dismissal/") (citation omitted)). A 
few other courts have taken the opposite approach 
and required the employer to prove that the 
conditions necessitating termination actually existed. 
See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 
Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880,895 (Mich. 1980) ("[W]here 
an employer has agreed to discharge an employee for 
cause only, its declaration that the employee was 
discharged for unsatisfactory work is subject to 
judicial review. The jury as trier of fact decides 
whether the employee was, in fact, discharged for 
unsatisfactory work."). 
Tf22 A far greater number of states have adopted 
a more balanced approach that requires an employer 
to justify termination with an objective good faith 
reason supported by facts reasonably believed to be 
true by the employer. See, e.g., Towson Univ. v. 
Conte, 862 A.2d 941, 950-51, 954 (Md. 2004) ("[I]n 
the just cause employment context, a jury's role is to 
determine the objective reasonableness of the 
employer's decision to discharge, which means that 
the employer act in objective good faith and base its 
decision on a reasoned conclusion and facts 
reasonably believed to be true by the employer." 
(emphasis omitted)). These courts recognize that an 
employer's justification for discharging an employee 
should not be taken at face value but also recognize 
that a judge or jury should not be called upon to 
second-guess an employer's business decisions. See 
e.g., Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int'l, Inc., 948 
P.2d 412,417 (Cal. 1998) ("'Although the jury must 
assess the legitimacy of the employer's decision to 
discharge, it should not be thrust into a managerial 
role.'" (citation and emphasis omitted)). 
f23 We agree with the majority of courts and 
adopt the objective reasonableness approach. 
Accordingly, in order to establish just cause on 
remand, UBMC need not prove that the Board's 
assumptions in terminating Dr. Hardy were true or 
that the benefits it expected were actually realized. 
Rather, UBMC need only show that the Board acted 
in good faith by adequately considering the facts it 
reasonably believed to be true at the time it made the 
decision. 
CONCLUSION 
[^24 We reverse the trial court's order granting 
summary judgement to UBMC and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
H25 WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
William A. Thome Jr., Judge 
1. The trial court determined that Dr. Hardy's post-remand 
affidavit should be excluded under the so-called "sham 
affidavit" rule. Although it does not affect our conclusion here, 
we disagree with the application of the rule in this case. 
Generally, a party may oppose a motion for summary 
judgment using affidavits, see Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c), unless the 
affidavit used contradicts the party's clear position taken in a 
previous deposition without explaining the discrepancy, see 
Harnicher v. University of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 71 
(Utah 1998). Here, Dr. Hardy did not take a clear position in 
his deposition, but only mentioned a few of the grounds 
justifying termination, including poor performance, death, 
blindness, or coma. Dr. Hardy's later affidavit testimony 
incorporates, clarifies, and expands his deposition testimony, 
but it does not contradict the prior deposition testimony and 
should be admissible. 
2. In his brief, Dr. Hardy asserts that 
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[i]t is clear that it makes no difference what Dr. 
Hardy understands "just cause" to mean. The scope 
of the clause applies to UBMC's power and/or 
understanding of its power. What is important, is the 
UBMC Board of Trustees' intent in contracting with 
Dr. Hardy as to those circumstances under which 
UBMC might terminate Dr. Hardy's Agreement. The 
focus should be on UBMC, not on what Dr. Hardy 
thought were the instances where he could be 
terminated. 
3. See also 82 Am. Jur. 2d Wrongful Discharge §179 
("Generally, good cause connotes a fair and honest cause or 
reason for dismissal applied in good faith on the part of the 
employer."); Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int'l, Inc., 948 
P.2d 412,422 (Cal. 1998) (defining "good cause" as "fair and 
honest reasons, regulated by good faith on the part of the 
employer, that are not trivial, arbitrary or capricious, unrelated 
to business needs or goals, or pretextual"); Gaudio v. Griffin 
Health Servs. Corp., 733 A.2d 197, 208 (Conn. 1999) 
('"[J]ust cause'. . . simply means that employers are forbidden 
. . . to act arbitrarily or capriciously." (other quotations and 
citation omitted; second omission in original)); Southwest Gas 
Corp. v. Vargas, 901 P.2d 693,701 (Nev. 1995) ("[W]e hold 
that discharge for 'just' or 'good' cause is one which is not for 
any arbitrary, capricious, or illegal reason "); Thompson 
v. Associated Potato Growers, Inc., 61 ON. W.2d 53,59 (N.D. 
2000) (quoting Cotran, supra); Baldwin v. Sisters of 
Providence in Wash., Inc., 769 P.2d 298, 304 (Wash. 1989) 
("We hold 'just cause' is fair and honest cause or reason, 
regulated by good faith on the part of the party exercising the 
power. We further hold a discharge for 'just cause' is one which 
is not for any arbitrary, capricious, or illegal reason . . . ."); 
Life Care Ctrs. of Am. v. Dexter, 65 P.3d 385, 392 (Wyo. 
2003) (quoting Cotran, supra). 
4. See also Zoerb v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 798 P.2d 1258, 
1262-63 (Alaska 1990) ("A reduction in work force compelled 
by legitimate and sufficient business reasons may constitute 
'good cause' to terminate an employee.") (citing cases from 
several jurisdictions); Havill v. Woodstock Soapstone Co., 
783 A.2d 423,428 (Vt. 2001) ("Economic circumstances that 
necessitate employer layoffs constitute good cause for 
termination." (quotations, citation, and alteration omitted)). 
5. We note that both parties have addressed this issue at length 
in their pleadings, memoranda, and briefs. Our search of the 
trial record does not indicate that Dr. Hardy has, in the course 
of these proceedings, identified any acts, or even a motive, to 
show that the Board's decision was compelled by non-business 
reasons constituting caprice, bad faith, or illegality. 
Nonetheless, we remand the question to allow the trial court to 
properly determine what further proceedings may be necessary. 
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DAVIS, Judge: 
TP Paul Harry Pedersen (Defendant) appeals his 
conviction of theft by receiving stolen property. 
See Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (2003).! We affirm. 
%2 Defendant does not dispute that the trial court 
properly instructed the jury regarding the mental 
states necessary to convict him of the crime 
charged—knowing and intentional. Instead, 
Defendant posits, without authority, the 
fundamentally illogical argument that the trial court 
committed reversible error when it refused to give 
his requested jury instruction regarding the less 
culpable mens reas of criminal negligence and 
recklessness, which are not elements of the charged 
offense or any lesser included offense. 
1[3 "We review the trial court's failure to give 
requested jury instructions for correctness, granting 
the trial court no particular deference in its 
determination." State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 
13,1)17, 17 P.3d 1153 (quotations and citation 
omitted). Moreover, "[fjailure to give requested jury 
instructions constitutes reversible error only if their 
omission tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of 
the complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously 
advises the jury on the law." Id (quotations and 
citation omitted). 
T[4 "[T]he general rule is that an accurate instruction 
upon the basic elements of an offense is essential.. 
. ." State v. Pearson, 1999 UT App 220,1(12, 985 
P.2d 919 (quotations and citation omitted); see also 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-501(1) (2003) ("A defendant 
in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent 
until each element of the offense charged against him 
is proved beyond a reasonable doubt."). "[F]ailure to 
provide such an instruction is reversible error that 
can never be considered harmless." Pearson, 1999 
UT App 220 at 1(12 (quotations and citation omitted). 
"An instruction that generally sets out the required 
mens rea for the elements of an offense is 
permissible." Id; see also American Fork v. Carr, 
970 P.2d 717, 720 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("When 
instructing the jury on the elements of the offense, 
the trial court must specifically instruct the jury 
regarding the culpable mental state required to 
commit the crime." (quotations and citation 
omitted)). A trial court need not give jury 
instructions regarding elements unnecessary for the 
conviction of the charged crime. See State v. Blea, 20 
Utah 2d 133, 434 P.2d 446, 449 (1967) (concluding 
that the trial court properly instructed the jury 
because the court omitted only information 
unnecessary for a conviction of the offense charged). 
1(5 We conclude that the trial court did not err in 
refusing Defendant's proposed mens rea instruction 
because criminal negligence and recklessness are not 
mental states necessary for Defendant's conviction of 
theft by receiving stolen property. 
%6 Affirmed. 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
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JOHN P. HARRINGTON (A5242) 
JONIJ.JONES(A7562) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Leo W. Hardy, M.D. 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY, 
ROOSEVELT DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH 
—ooOoo— 
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER, : 
JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, 
v. : Civil No. 990000109CV 
LEO W. HARDY, M.D., : 
Judge: John R. Anderson 
Defendant. : 
LEO W. HARDY, M.D., 
Counterclaimant and 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER and 
THOMAS J. ALLRED, M.D., : 
Counterclaim Defendant : 
and Third-Party 
Defendant. : 
—ooOoo— 
Defendant and Third-Party PlaintifFLeo W. Hardy, M D . ("Dr. Hardy"), and Plaintiff 
Uintah Basin Medical Center ("UBMC"), stipulate to the following facts: 
1. Dr. Hardy is a board certified Pathologist. 
2. UBMC is the business name for Duchesne County Hospital which is owned by 
Duchesne County and operated by its own Board of Trustees. 
3. On November 29, 1994, Dr. Hardy and UBMC entered into a contract ("the 
Agreement") in which Dr. Hardy agreed to provide professional services for UBMC as director of 
the hospital's pathology laboratory and to perform related duties. (A copy of the Agreement is 
attached as Exhibit "A"). The language of the Agreement was taken from a contract between 
UBMC and Dr. Sannella (a pathologist at UBMC that immediately preceded Dr. Hardy). 
Dr. Hardy modified the contract slightly and returned the edited contract to UBMC. The 
Agreement was then typed onto Duchesne County Hospital letterhead and signed by Bradley D. 
LeBaron ("Mr. LeBaron"), who was UBMC's administrator and had authority to enter into 
personal service contracts on UBMC's behalf. 
4. Paragraph 11 of the Agreement provides: 
This agreement shall become effective August 1, 1994 and continue to bind 
the parties to the terms hereof until terminated after ninety (90) days 
written notice for just cause of termination by either party or by mutual 
consent of the parties to a shorter notice period. 
5. The UBMC Board of Trustees ("the Board") is the entity authorized to terminate 
personal services contract. 
2 
6. On July 18, 1996, the Board voted to terminate the Agreement and to invite 
Dr. Thomas J. Allred ("Dr. Allred") to join UBMC's medical staff as a pathologist and as an 
emergency room physician. 
7. On July 22, 1996, Dr. Hardy encountered Dr.Allred at UBMC. The two 
physicians engaged in a verbal exchange. 
8. On July 26, 1996, Mr. LeBaron telephoned Dr. Hardy to discuss UBMCs decision 
to terminate the Agreement. In a letter dated July 29, 1996, Mr. LeBaron informed Dr. Hardy 
that UBMC was terminating the Agreement. The letter, in its entirety, stated: 
As a followup to our telephone conference of July 26, 1996 and pursuant 
to the terms of our agreement dated November 29, 1994 item #11 which 
allows for a 90-day termination period, I am hereby giving you notice of 
termination of our contract effective October 29, 1996. 
This same section of our contract allows for a shorter length of termination 
by mutual consent. In our phone conversation, you agreed to work out the 
90-day termination period. 
On behalf of our Board, Medical Staff, and patients, I offer our sincere 
appreciation for your services to our hospital and patients. 
9. Dr. Hardy continued working for UBMC until October 28, 1996, approximately 
90 days after UBMC notified him it was terminating the Agreement. 
10. Prior to his termination, Dr. Hardy performed his obligations under the Agreement 
satisfactorily and received no complaints from UBMC or its medical staff. After termination of 
the Agreement, on a few occasions, at the request of members of the UBMC medical staff, and 
with the approval of the UBMC administration, Dr. Hardy performed limited pathology services 
for members of the UBMC medical staff in Dr. Alfred's absence. 
3 
11. In its Memorandum in Opposition to Dr. Hardy's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, UBMC asserted that Dr. Hardy's conduct during the July 22, 1996 encounter with 
Dr. Allred constituted additional just cause for its decision to terminate Dr. Hardy's contract. The 
dedsion to terminate was made on July 18, 1996. The Notice of Termination was given to 
Dr. Hardy verbally on July 26, 1996 and in writing on July 29, 1996. 
t 
DATED this Q ^ d a y of September, 1999. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
John P. Harrington * 
Joni J. Jones 
Attorneys for Leo W. Hardy M.D. 
DATED this ?Ji day of September, 1999. 
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
dne J. Benard 
Jenniffer Nelson Byde 
Attorneys for UBMC 
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November 29, 1994 
Leo W, Hardy, M . D . 
P.O. Box 795 
Price, UT 84501 
Dear Dr. Hardy: 
We appreciate your response to our request to have a formal agreement in handling our 
Pathology needs. Listed below is the proposal submitted by you. I have reviewed this with 
Joe Hokett and have found that it meets the needs of Uintah Basin Medical Center at this 
time. Our agreement, therefore, includes the following: 
1. Dr, Hardy agrees to personally visit the Uintah Basin Medical Center Laboratory 
weekly or will have another pathologist visit the hospital if he is unavailable. 
2 . Visits will not be substituted with technologists. Duration of visit will be for one to 
two hours devoted to the following activities: 
a. CAP proficiency survey reviews. 
b . Review of Uintah Basin Medical Center QC program. 
c. Recommending process to investigate technical and administrative problems 
and advise adoption of policies and/or procedures for correction. 
d. Develop liaison with all full-time Medical Staff members to enable full 
understanding of laboratory's role in supporting Medical Staffs mission. Will 
attend Medical Staff meetings quarterly. This meeting will be considered that 
week's laboratory visit. 
3 . Will be available to the Medical Staff for help with interpretation of laboratory 
results. This would be a physician-to-physician consult. 
4 . Will be available for more complex consultations, bone marrow biopsies, or fine 
needle aspiration biopsy of superficial masses (i.e., breast, thyroid, lymph node). 
Procedures in these categories will be direct patient services and will be billed as 
such. 
5 . Will undertake teaching activities for both Medical Staff and Laboratory Staff when 
new procedures are to be introduced. 
|-7Z-(b 
Leo W. Hardy, MJX 
November 29, 1994 
Page 2 of 2 
6. Every opportunity to educate Laboratory Staff in those areas where new 
information or the need for better understanding of the need for clinical consultation 
will be pursued. 
7, Will taJce responsibility for continued CLIA accreditation, including interim self-
inspection, review of manuals, and all activities CLIA has identified as Laboratory 
Director responsibilities. 
8- Uintah Basin Medical Center is permitted to formally register me with the State of 
Utah and CAP as Laboratory Director, and inclusion of my name on any and all 
laboratory reports, thus documenting my medicolegal relationship with the Uintah 
Basin Medical Center Laboratory. 
9. Uintah Basin Medical Center will pay a Laboratory Directors fee of $400.00 per 
months 
10. All surgical pathology and extra-genital cytology is referred to the Laboratory 
Director's practice, additional activities such as Medical Staff committee work will be 
undertaken. These may include Infection Control, Tissue Reviews, Surgical Case 
Review, Blood Utilization Review, and involvement in hospical-widc Continuing 
Quality Improvement. 
11. This agreement shall become effective August 1, 1994 and continue co bind the parties 
to the terms hereof until terminated after ninety (90) days written notice for just cause 
of termination by either party or by mutual consent of the parties to a shorter notice 
period. 
Your signature below indicates your acceptance of the responsibilities, services and benefits 
listed below. 
Sincerely, 
Bradley D.XcBaron, CHE 
Administrator 
Leo W. E&/dy, N£D. 
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November 29, 1994 
Leo W. Hardy, M.D. 
P.O. Box 795 
Price, UT 84501 
Dear Dr. Hardy: 
We appreciate your response to our request to have a formal agreement in handling our 
Pathology needs. Listed below is the proposal submitted by you, I have reviewed this with 
Joe Hokett and have found that it meets the needs of Uintah Basin MedicaJ Center at this 
time. Our agreement, therefore, includes the following: 
1. Dr. Hardy agrees to personally visit the Uintah Basin MedicaJ Center Laboratory 
weekly or will have another pathologist visit the hospital if he is unavailable. 
2. Visits will not be substituted with technologists. Duration of visit will be for one to 
two hours devoted to the following activities: 
a. CAP proficiency survey reviews. 
b. Review of Uintah Basin Medical Center QC program. 
c. Recommending process to investigate technical and administrative problems 
and advise adoption of policies and/or procedures for correction. 
d. Develop liaison with all full-time Medical Staff members to enable full 
understanding of laboratory's rale in supporting Medical Staffs mission. Will 
attend Medical Staff meetings quarterly. This meeting will be considered that 
week's laboratory visit. 
3. Will be available to the Medical Staff for help with interpretation of laboratory 
results. This would be a physician-to-physician consult. 
4. Will be available for more complex consultations, bone marrow biopsies, or fine 
needle aspiration biopsy of superficial masses (i.e., breast, thyroid, lymph node). 
Procedures in these categories will be direct patient services and will be billed as 
such. 
5. Will undertake teaching activities for both Medical Staff and Laboratory Staff when 
new procedures are to be introduced. 
\m^ 
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November 29, 1994 
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6. Every opportunity to educate Laboratory Staff in those areas where new 
information or the need for better understanding of the need for clinical consultation 
will be pursued. 
7. Will take responsibility for continued CLIA accreditation, including interim self-
inspection, review of manuals, and all activities CLIA has identified as Laboratory 
Director responsibilities. 
8. Uintah Basin Medical Center is permitted 10 formally register me with the State of 
Utah and CAP as Laboratory Director, and inclusion of my name on any and all 
laboratory reports, thus documenting my medicolegal relationship with the Uintah 
Basin Medical Center Laboratory* 
9. Uintah Basin Medical Center will pay a Laboratory Director's fee of $400.00 per 
month, 
10. All surgical pathology and extra-genital cytology is referred to the Laboratory 
Directors practice, additional activities such as Medical Staff committee work will be 
undertaken. These may include Infection Control, Tissue Reviews, Surgical Case 
Review, Blood Utilization Review, and involvement in hospital-wide Continuing 
Quality Improvement. 
11. This agreement shall become effective August 1, 1994 and continue to bind the parties 
to the terms hereof until terminated after ninety (90) days written notice for just cause 
of termination by either party or by mutual consent of the parties to a shorter notice 
period. 
Your signature below indicates your acceptance of the responsibilities, services and benefits 
listed below. 
Sincerely, 
^VS^ 
Bradley D.XeBaron, CHE 
Administrator 
LeoW 
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HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
Blaine J. Benard, #5661 
Jessica L. Harshbarger, #7879 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-5800 
Facsimile: (801) 521-9639 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Third-party Defendant 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, 
ROOSEVELT DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH 
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER, j 
Plaintiff, ) 
V . j 
LEO W. HARDY, M.D. ) 
Defendant. ] 
LEO W. HARDY, M. D., ] 
Counterclaimant and ] 
Third-Party Plaintiff, ; 
V . 
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER ] 
and THOMAS J. ALLRED,M.D., ; 
Counterclaim Defendant ' 
and Third-Party Defendant ' 
) AFFIDAVIT OF 
1 BRADLEY D. LEBARON 
Civil No. 960800050 
1 Judge John R. Anderson 
i (Declaratory Judgment Action) 
I EXHIBIT I 
I ? A I 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE ) 
Bradley D. LeBaron, having been duly sworn upon oath, and having personal knowledge 
of the facts asserted herein, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am Hospital Administrator for Uintah Basin Medical Center ("UBMC"), located 
in Roosevelt, Utah. UBMC is owned by Duchesne County and operated by the Board of 
Trustees. I am authorized by UBMCs Board of Trustees to enter into personal services contracts 
on behalf of UBMC. Typically, UBMC enters into contracts for personal services with medical 
personnel for terms of one or two years. 
2. In November 1994,1 signed an agreement with Dr. Leo Hardy on behalf of 
UBMC. Under the terms of this Agreement, Dr. Hardy was to serve as Laboratory Director for 
UBMC and was to be provided with a fee for his services. The contract contained no term of 
duration. It is my understanding that Dr. Hardy, who resides in Price, Utah, entered into similar 
agreements with other rural hospitals. 
3. During the period in which he provided services to UBMC, Dr. Hardy functioned 
as a part-time, off-site pathologist. Generally, Dr. Hardy, who had to travel from Price, was only 
at UBMC one day per week for just a few hours. Dr. Hardy worked a total of approximately 
eight hours per month at UBMC. 
4. During the summer of 1996, UBMC began exploring the possibility of inviting 
Dr. Thomas Allred to join UBMCs medical staff. Dr. Allred is board-certified in both pathology 
and emergency medicine. Dr. Allred indicated to UBMC that he was interested in relocating to 
Roosevelt and in working full-time as a pathologist and part-time as an emergency medicine 
#57017 2 
physician. Dr. Allred also informed UBMC that if he joined UBMCs medical staff, he would 
provide his own laboratory equipment, worth approximately $70,000. 
5. UBMC determined that the public's health, welfare and interest would be better 
served by having a full-time doctor on staff who could perform the dual functions of pathology 
and emergency medicine. UBMC determined that the addition of Dr. Allred to UBMCs medical 
staff would benefit Duchesne County and the surrounding community, since he would also be a 
full-time resident and member of that community, an issue that is always of concern in a rural 
area. The county would also benefit from the addition of Dr. Alfred's laboratory equipment to 
UBMCs facilities. As a county entity, UBMC was acutely aware of and concerned with the 
effect of its staffing decisions as they relate to the provision of health care services to the county. 
6. UBMC also had legitimate business reasons for hiring Dr. Allred and terminating 
Dr. Hardy's Agreement. Financial constraints made it economically feasible and more efficient 
for UBMC to hire Dr. Allred, since he was able to be at the hospital full-time and to perform two 
functions, pathology and emergency medicine. These business reasons contributed to UBMCs 
decision to eliminate the part-time pathology position and replace it with a full-time 
pathology/emergency medicine position, which better suited the needs of the hospital and the 
community. 
7. After the Board of Trustees weighed the reasons for hiring Dr. Allred, the Board 
elected to terminate Dr. Hardy's Agreement with UBMC. The decision to terminate the 
Agreement was made on July 18,1996. 
#57017 3 
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8. On or about July 22,1996,1 was informed by UBMCs Assistant Administrator for 
Physician Services of an incident that took place in the hospital involving Dr. Hardy and Dr. 
Alfred. 
9. On July 26,1996,1 telephoned Dr, Hardy to inform him that UBMC planned to 
tenniiiEte its Agreement for pathology services. 
10. On July 29,1996,1 sent Dr, Hardy a letter notifying him that UBMC was 
terminating the Agreement with the hospital. Dr. Hardy's relationship with UBMC was to 
terminate 90 days after the notice of termination. 
11. Afler being offered a position on UBMCs medical staff, Dr. Allred accepted the 
offer and relocated lo Roosevelt, Utah. As promised, he brought with him the $70,000 worth of 
laboratory equipment thai he owns. Dr. Allred continues to practice full-time at UBMC in 
pathology and part-time in emergency medicine, 
DATED this /0 day of July, 1998. 
Bradley D. Le^gron 
AFFIANT 
& On ibis (Cr' day of July, 1998, BRADLEY D. LEBARON appeared before me and 
acknowledged that he signed this Affidavit and that the statements contained therein arc true and 
correct 
[SEAL] _ _ _ 
T-mr 
Notary Pubfc 
Strjto cf Utcfi 
My Comm. E*ptei Jen & 2001 
m *m m w m w 
Public 
Redding at 'JM£ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ID day of July, 1998,1 caused to be mailed by United 
States first-class mail, postage thereon fully prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document, to the following: 
John P. Harrington, Esq. 
Frederick R. Thaler, Esq. 
Joni J. Jones, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
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understanding is it's somewhere between $80,000 and $100,000. 
Q. Does Dr. Allred have a guarantee? 
A. No, he does not. 
Q. Go ahead. 
A. Subsequent to that is going to come a technical 
component fee that the hospital is going to be able to bill 
for the services. And that fee is — I don't know the exact 
numbers. I'm just going to estimate that being an $8 0,000 
kind of proposition. By the time you net all that out 
against the expenses that are associated with it we at year 
end number two feel like we're pretty much at a break even 
point. So the economic situation is no worse off than where 
we were before. 
The benefits therefore are more in regards to the 
immediacy of personality, the immediacy of him being here, 
the fact that he's in the community, lives in the community, 
pays taxes in the community, participates in the community 
processes, lends himself to the leadership of the medical 
staff and the organization of such processes that he's 
invited to be involved in there which he does probably as 
well as any physician that I've had the opportunity to work 
with. So probably the pure dollar and cents don't work out 
to much better than what we had with Dr. Hardy, but the added 
advantages of having this individual in our community I think 
do end up on the balance sheet to the positive. 
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let's do this first. Can you identify for me your 
handwriting? 
A. Yes, I've written along the left margin, Roger, 
Brad, Brad, Dr. Pehrson, Brad. The note dated 2/16/99 I 
attached when Blaine asked for this information as a note 
that Leland Heller's reference would be on a note that was 
attached. My handwriting then on the date the reference was 
given is aside Edward Becker, aside Wayne Campbell, aside 
Butch Anderson and under the notation 22nd which indicates 
various positions on our staff. 
Q. It's generally the dark? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Let me have you explain to me the indications on 
the left hand column, Roger, Brad, Brad, Dr. Pehrson, Brad. 
What do those indicate? 
A. Those were individuals whom were given the 
assignment to contact that specific reference. 
Q. So the first one would have been Leland Heller 
and Roger Marett was given the assignment to call him? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Edward Becker is the next one and that was 
assigned to you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Wayne Campbell was assigned to you? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Juan Remos was assigned to Dr. Pehrson? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then Butch Anderson was assigned to you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Unfortunately we don't have dates on when these 
notes were made. But from your previous testimony I believe 
you said that initially back in July that you started this 
process of checking references? 
A. I believe this would have taken place between the 
11th and 15th of July. 
Q. Next to Edward Becker there is handwriting. I 
take it you actually spoke with Dr. Becker? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. I'm going to read this. I wish we could have him 
at our hospital? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Doctor high respect, pathology and you have in 
quotes a 10, sincere moral individual, can't imagine you 
could do any better, couldn't find a better pathologist, 
asset to the community, family man, religious. 
A. Those are my notations. 
Q. Dr. Becker was a neurologist, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How did you interrupt that telephone 
conversation? 
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A. Very positive. 
Q. Next one was Mr. Wayne Campbell. Do you see 
that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It says secretary. Is it actually the secretary 
to Mr. Wayne Campbell you spoke? 
A. Prior to getting Mr. Campbell I had a short 
conversation with his secretary. Those are her comments. 
Q. You didn't actually talk to Wayne Campbell? 
A. I did, the second paragraph there. 
Q. Starting with one of the finest human beings? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who is Mr. Wayne Campbell? 
A. My understanding is he is the administrator of 
the hospital that Dr. Allred previously worked at. 
Q. Again, you had very positive comments from 
Mr. Campbell, correct? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Next one is Mr. Butch Anderson, M.D.? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you see that? It says competent, a few 
questions regarding his management of critical patients, 
couple of months there, very personable, good care rendered, 
correct? 
A. Correct, those are the statements I wrote. 
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Q. What was your reaction after receiving those 
comments? 
A. I asked more questions about the second of those 
comments, the few questions regarding his management of 
critical patients. He indicated that that was specific to 
high volume ER situations. Their volume being almost triple 
the amount of volume that we see in our emergency room. I 
noted it, made a mental note and then I guess to some degree 
mitigated the content thereof because of the additional 
information that I got. 
Q. Now there is a paragraph over to the side that 
starts with the 22nd? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is this a poll that you took of the medical 
staff? 
A. I just basically individually went and talked 
with each of the physicians. 
Q. Preston said yes, is that what that indicates? 
A. Buxton I think is the first one. 
Q. White is a yes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Three M's? 
A. That's Mitchell, Mitchell and Morrill. 
Q. HaJ, ER? 
A. Hal was in the ER and I didn't get his comment. 
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1 at this hospital? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. It wasn't independent? It wasn't through meeting 
4 Dr. Allred on the street or through happenstance? 
5 A. No. 
6 Q. Tell me what you recall of what was described 
7 about Dr. Allred when you as a board member became acquainted 
8 with his interest in joining the facility. 
9 A. A pathologist who is willing to come and live in 
10 our area, would expand our laboratory services in the 
11 hospital, would provide some needed help in our emergency 
12 room being board certified there too, and would bring his 
13 family to our community. 
14 Q. Maybe this is going to shorten things. Let me 
15 show you what has been marked as Exhibit 24, which are copies 
16 of notes from the board of trustees meeting of July 18. 
17 Mr. Snow, I'm going to ask you to review those. My first 
18 question is going to be is that meeting the first time you 
19 learned of Dr. Allred's interest? 
2 0 A. No, I don't think it would have been. 
21 Q. So sometime prior to this discussion would have 
22 been when you first learned of it? 
23 A. That's correct. 
24 Q. Do you know when that was? 
25 A. I don't remember. 
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we'll look for them. I haven't seen such thing as a joint 
committee. 
THE WITNESS: I have no idea that's where I 
learned it. I can tell you from reading this that I knew or 
I assume I knew before this of Dr. Allred's desire. 
Q. Now this in that answer is Exhibit 24, page 277 
through 278, correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. After reading this what leads you to believe that 
you knew of this prior? 
A. Because we took action of this on this day. It 
wasn't an immediate thing. I remember it being an ongoing 
discussion of some kind. 
Q. Describe to me those discussions. 
A. Generally the interest of Dr. Allred in coming, 
the interest of the community in having a full time 
pathologist and basically that. From this exhibit Dr. Hardy 
was familiar with those discussions because he was bringing 
someone with him, proposing to give us better service, 
recognizing that he hadn't stepped up to the plate at that 
point. 
Q. Let me stop you there. Is it your testimony that 
you have facts or evidence that Dr. Hardy knew of Dr. Allred 
with respect to his interest and that he did not, as you 
describe, step up to the plate? Is that your testimony? 
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A. I don't know. 
Q. You're a member of the board and you're 
testifying as a representative of the board. I'm trying to 
figure out what that means. 
A. I don't know what it means. I assume it means 
the discussion that Dr. Hardy had a partner that he was going 
to put here and they took no action on that. 
Q. But that's speculation on your part? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You don't have a recollection of what that means? 
A. No. 
Q. The next sentence says, Dr. Allred has received 
highly complimentary references from those people called 
regarding his capabilities and character. Do you see that? 
A. I do. 
Q. What is the expectation of the board as to 
checking references on doctors that they're going to hire? 
A. Administration arid interested physicians that 
might be assigned by the administration call and check 
references. The board would expect that references will be 
checked. 
Q. So in the oversight capacity of the board they 
would expect the administration to check references, correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Dr. Allred was going to be hired as a 
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pathologist, correct? 
A. Partly. 
Q. He was going to be hired as a pathologist, 
correct? 
A. That's correct. He was going to have other 
assignments too. 
Q. Would it be your expectation, that being the 
board of which you're the corporate representative here, that 
in fact administration would talk to pathologists in regards 
to the previous history of Dr. Allred? 
A. I would assume that administration would check 
references where they felt were needed, hospitals. I would 
hope that would be as important or more important than other 
pathologists. But a hospital to see the quality of service 
and timeliness of the service that he has been performing. I 
think that's part of the details the board left to the 
administration, you pick the references that you need to 
become familiar with. 
Q. You and I sitting here today, you've testified 
you don't have a medical degree and I can tell you I don't 
have one. Wouldn't we as laymen expect that if you're going 
to hire a pathologist that you talk to pathologists about 
that person? 
A. No. 
Q. No? 
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A. No, I don't think so. I don't see anything wrong 
with talking to pathologists. I think talking to a user of 
the pathology service, whether it's another physician or in a 
different specialty or his employer would be just as good or 
better reference than up here. 
Q. And a user of pathology services you would think 
that would be someplace you would want to go and talk to? 
A. That's another option, sure. 
Q. As a member of the board were you concerned about 
the fact that the administration did not talk to any 
pathologists or users of pathology services of Dr. Allred 
prior to him coming to UBMC? 
A. To this day I don't know who the administration 
called. 
Q. I'll represent to you again to get this moved 
along that Mr. LeBaron and Mr. Marett have testified under 
oath that in fact no pathologists were spoken to. 
A. It doesn't come as any surprise. 
Q. It doesn't? 
A. No. 
Q. So in your line of thinking as a representative 
of the board that's okay to hire a pathologist without 
talking to pathologists? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You wouldn't be troubled by the fact that 
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about that decision? 
A. My recollection is really only what I see in 
these minutes and I don't recall anything else other than 
what you've refreshed my memory here* 
Q. So unconditionally the decision had been made on 
July 18 to terminate Dr. Hardy; is that not correct? 
A. Your term unconditionally, I think that new 
information or something else obviously could have changed 
decisions of the board. 
Q. But it didn't, did it? 
A. No, apparently it didn't. 
Q. I've asked this question a little bit, but I want 
to ask you what you as a member of the board and 
representative of the board, the reason you wanted to hire 
Dr. Allred was you've told me he would be an on-site 
pathologist and he would be an ER doc, correct? 
A. I would say there are several things. Our 
pathology service would be improved by expanding the 
pathology department, the laboratory department. He was 
board certified in the emergency room and that was an 
additional asset that he brought with him. And that he was 
willing to from an economic standpoint come and live in our 
community and be one of our neighbors and spend his money 
that we would pay to him here. 
Q. Prior to his being hired was there any 
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Q. Again, I asked you this question but I want to 
ask it again. You know of no doctors that complained about 
the pathology services rendered by Dr. Hardy? 
A. No, I don't know of any. 
Q. I'm trying to figure out where this board came to 
the conclusion that it wanted to expand pathology services 
when you didn't have any complaints and you don't have any 
evidence or facts that would suggest it would support a full 
time pathologist. 
A. You're talking about a full time pathologist. 
Our particular interest in Dr. Allred is he had other skills 
besides the pathology. We felt like we could use him in 
other services because he was board certified somewhere 
else. We knew we couldn't support a full time pathologist. 
There is a long way between two days a month and full time 
and we wanted somewhere in the middle. 
Q. So I take it by that response you would be 
surprised to know that Dr. Hardy was here every week at this 
hospital? 
A. Yes, I would be real surprised. 
Q. Would you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you acquainted with frozen sections? 
A. No. 
Q. Are you acquainted with the needs of surgeons 
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UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES MEETING 
MINUTES 
2 DEPOSITION 
1 EXHIBIT 
1 
DATE: 
PLACE: 
PRESENT: 
EXCUSED: 
July 18, 1996 
Uintah Basin Medical Center Board Room 
Harry Fieldsted, Gordon Snow, Gayle Young, Dr. 
Wayne Stewart, Gail Hamilton, Curtis Dastrup, Smiley 
Arrowchis, Bradley D. LeBaron, Ray Hussey, 
Laurel Cranney, Marilynn Duncan 
Dr. Hal Mitchell, Owen Van Tassell 
CALL TO ORDER: Harry Fieldsted, Chairman; 7:00 p.m. 
Minutes: 
The minutes of the June 1996 Board of Trustees Meeting were approved upon a 
motion by Gail Hamilton with a second by Gordon Snow. Voting was 
unanimous. 
Quality Assurance and .Safety Report: 
Laurel Cranney gave the Quality Assurance and Safety Report. It was noted that 
deliveries for the first quarter of 1996 were 93 and 79 for the second quarter of 
1996. Total deaths were nine for the first quarter and 12 for the second. Deaths 
in the Emergency Room were two for the first quarter and eight for the second. 
There were 25 emergency patients in each quarter who were transferred to 
another acute care facility. There were 25 inpatients transferred for services not 
provided by the hospital in the first quarter and 32 in the second. Ongoing 
projects include the diabetic project and also the OB project. Home Health, OB, 
and ICU have all made recent changes due to information collected for quality 
assurance. The Clinic has a plan in place and is collecting data. There were 30 
patient complaints regarding the Emergency Room in 1995, particularly dealing 
with the way patients feel they were treated. This area deserves looking into. 
There were a total of 69 complaints in 1995 wherein the hospital was contacted 
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with 3,000 discharged patients. The nursing staff is currently calling patients 
after their discharge to follow up and do further educating. A motion to accept 
the Quality Assurance and Safety Report was made by Gayle Young and was 
seconded by Gail Hamilton. Voting was unanimous. 
Building rnmmifiee.: 
Gordon Snow reported on the activities of the Building Committee and reviewed 
the building cost matrix. The anticipated date for completion of the new medical 
office building is still the middle of September. Very few subcontractors have 
been brought in from outside the Basin, and the Construction Supervisor has been 
quite pleased with the work of our local people. A shipment of windows were 
recently received and, upon the review of Chris Cooper, were determined to be 
below Cooper's standard. They were subsequently replaced with another 
window which had moldings to match the existing building. This was done at 
considerable expense to Coopers and demonstrated commendable integrity. 
The Board gave the Building Committee an assignment to review space for a 
Medical Staff library and to address the request made by Drs. Buxton and White 
to remain in their existing clinic rather than moving to the new medical office 
building. These items required a review of all existing space and yielded the 
following suggestions: 1) There are nine spaces in the new medical office 
building and we will utilize 7 XA with Dr. Teresa Stewart, Dr. Mark Mitchell, 
Dr. Hal Mitchell, Drs. Morrill, Ripplinger, Smith, Brilliant, and visiting 
physicians. 2) The Obstetric Clinic (Evans building) will accommodate Dr. 
Evans and Callie Webb, leaving room for a new obstetrician as one is recruited. 
3) In the East Clinic (Buxton Building) will be Drs. Buxton and White, Bonnie 
Crozier and Administration. 4) In the Surgical Clinic (Indian Health) will be 
Orthopaedics, Pathology, General Surgery and the Medical Staff Library. 
It was noted that Cooper's bid includes all the millwork for the medical office 
building. 
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A motion to accept the Building Committee Report was made by Gail Hamilton, 
seconded by Smiley Arrowchis, and voting was unanimous • 
Human .Resources: 
Dr. Wayne Stewart, Chairman of the Human Resources Committee, reported that 
Representative Beverly Evans recently met with the committee and understands 
the hospital's situation regarding our involvement in the State Retirement Fund. 
She indicated that in our efforts to opt off the plan, we should gain the support of 
the Board and the County Commission then obtain the understanding of the 
Governor. The Governor can give a strong recommendation to the Retirement 
Board. Representative Evans expressed her willingness to attend all the meetings 
we desire her to attend. The Board in the June Board Meeting voted to pursue 
whatever steps are necessary to opt off the State plan. A meeting is scheduled 
with the County Commission on July 30 at 3:00 p.m. to discuss this matter. An 
updated study from Peterson & Associates revealed the same trends as the initial 
study, demonstrating a need to choose another retirement program in order to 
maximize our benefits to both employees and the hospital. 
A motion was made by Gail Hamilton and seconded by Wayne Stewart that the 
State be approached as outlined by Representative Evans and asked that we be 
allowed to opt off the State Retirement plan. Voting was unanimous. 
Beverly Evans suggested that Bob Linnell be invited here with representatives 
from the County Commission, the Board and Administration. Employees could 
be involved on the task force. This meeting could conceivably be held on the 
same day representatives from the Governor's office come to meet with the 
County, 
A motion was made by Curtis Dastrup and seconded by Smiley Arrowchis to 
accept the Human Resources Report as given. Voting was unanimous 
Chief of Staff Report: 
In Dr. Hal Mitchell's absence, Dr.Wayne Stewart reported on Medical Staff 
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activity. Dr. Hardy and a pathologist who joined him came to Medical Staff 
Meeting regarding their proposal to put a pathologist in the Basin. Appreciation 
was expressed to Dr. Hardy for what he has done for our facility. This 
information is being considered in relationship to Dr. Thomas Allred joining our 
facility as a Pathologist/ER physician. The Medical Staff took no formal action 
regarding the matter. Dr. Allred has received highly complimentary references 
from those people called regarding his capabilities and character. Dr. Allred 
would be at the hospital full time and has asked that he be paid a clinical lab 
director's fee of $2,000 a month plus a percentage of billing. For the same type 
of service, Dr. Hardy works eight hours a month, and we pay him $400. Dr. 
Allred also desires, for the first year, to work four shifts per month in ER. The 
overall cost to us would be $2,000 a month and the costs involved in setting up 
an anatomical lab which would cost approximately $10,000 in capital expense. 
He will bring about $70,000 worth of equipment with him to install in our 
building. Dr. Allred is desirous of moving to Roosevelt and making his home 
here. 
A motion was made by Gordon Snow that we give Dr. Hardy 90-days notice as 
per his contract and offer Dr. Allred an invitation to join our facility. The 
motion was seconded by Gail Hamilton, and voting was unanimous. 
A motion to accept the Chief of Staff Report was made by Gayle Young with a 
second by Curtis Dastrup, and voting was unanimous. 
Financial Report: 
The Financial Report was made by Gayle Young and Ray Hussey. Inpatient 
Days, Admissions and Surgeries were down for the month. We also had fewer 
Births. Revenue was down and so were Operating Expenses. There was a 
combined loss for the Clinics of $17,000. We had a Net Gain for the month of 
June of $76,000. Ray Hussey indicated we are billing more quickly on accounts 
and after four months of nonpayment, turning the account to collections so we 
don't have an accumulation of long-standing, over-due billings. The current 
trend is almost two to one outpatient over inpatient services. It was reported that 
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due to not having a provider in the Duchesne Valley Medical Clinic, revenue 
there had dropped and $4,000 was lost for the month. There is a Year-to-Date 
Gain on the Clinics of $9,000. A motion to accept the Financial Report as given 
was made by Smiley Arrowchis, seconded by Curtis Dastrup, and voting was 
unanimous. 
Charity Care Policy: 
The Charity Care Policy had been distributed earlier to the Board for their 
review. It was pointed out that the Charity Care Policy is an opportunity to let 
people feel good about themselves rather than classifying their account as bad 
debt, if they meet the charity care criteria. A motion was made by Gordon Snow 
and seconded by Dr. Wayne Stewart to adopt the Charity Care Policy as 
outlined. Voting was unanimous. 
Hospice; 
There is a great deal of excitement regarding our hospice program which was 
recently granted licensure from the State. Jan Roberts is supervising this 
program, and we should have Medicare approval in approximately six weeks 
Durable Meriiral Equipment: 
Discussion was held regarding the possibility of purchasing equipment from 
Mountain Air Gas to buy tanks, equipment to fill our own oxygen tanks, and 
liquid oxygen equipment. We would be able to acquire an interest-free loan for 
three years with a 16-month pay off for equipment. We would realize a savings 
of $21,000 per year. There are currently ten patients on the liquid oxygen 
program. A motion was made by Gail Hamilton to invest $50,000 into the 
purchase of oxygen equipment. This motion was seconded by Dr. Wayne 
Stewart, and voting was unanimous. 
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Administrator's Report: 
Radiology: 
Commendations were extended to our Radiology Department for the high rating 
they received from the American College of Radiology regarding our ultrasound 
program. This is the first year we have sought this rating, and it is very valuable 
to the department in showing employees and the public that the care they get here 
in ultrasound is the very best. 
THC Contract: 
The Managed Care Committee met and reviewed the contract from IHC on the 
establishment of BasinMed. Since that time, we have had discussions with Blaine 
Benard who indicated he is not comfortable with several items as they are 
presented. Ray Hussey reported on some basic philosophical items noting that 
over time, changes have occurred from the position of the Memorandum of 
Understanding. We have sought repeatedly to maintain a community basis for 
our plan with us maintaining administrative duties. A clause in the contract states 
that this responsibility will be ours upon joint approval by us and IHC. In 
discussions with IHC, they have indicated that we may never have administrative 
control. Regarding pricing, it was pointed out that our desire was to sell the 
insurance for a bit less initially then later offer more of a discount through risk 
sharing. The prices have come in at 10-20% less, and we are not in a very good 
position to be competitive later. If we only can raise the price later, it will not be 
favorable for our community. If we sell for more now, we don't get the extra 
money, IHC does. Concerns were also expressed regarding the marketing and 
sales of BasinMed. The individual enrollment card has a very small insignia of 
BasinMed, and the booklets don't mention our name. We also want to be 
involved with agents in establishing the program. IHC has retracted our 
involvement and has announced that SelectMed is in the Basin. When the agent 
sells, we are only providing care for less money. Ray Hussey suggested that we 
research what it would take to get our own license. We could then lease the 
SelectMed network, do the underwriting and market by our own rules. We are 
getting into managed care, doing our own utilization review, and are taking the 
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right steps in the right direction, Blaine Benard recommends not signing the 
contract until we are comfortable with it. A motion was made by Dr. Wayne 
Stewart that we not accept the contract with IHC as it is now and that 
Administration pursue the desired course and sign only when the contract is 
acceptable. Gail Hamilton seconded the motion, and voting was unanimous. 
Draft Documents: 
Draft Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws for the PHO have been prepared by 
Blaine Benard using information from Sierra View from California. If the 
physicians could review these documents and come to a consensus, there would 
be strength in having the organization in place when we meet with Blue Cross 
Blue Shield. These documents formalize the organization; they do not put 
policies and procedures into place. Legally, we should not represent the 
physicians in a negotiating capacity until the PHO organization is in place. The 
PHO should negotiate as a single entity, not as the IPA and hospital. The IPA is 
doing final reviews and it was suggested that concerns should be addressed 
through an ad hoc committee, perhaps an extension of the Managed Care 
Committee, with any Board Member being invited to participate. A motion was 
made by Gail Hamilton and seconded by Dr. Wayne Stewart that we take another 
month to get prepared and ask the Medical Staff to be ready with their 
organization by next Board Meeting. Voting was unanimous. 
Blue Crass Bine Shield: 
Brad LeBaron asked for clarification in details for negotiating with Blue Cross 
Blue Shield. Discussions were held with the School Board and Administration 
regarding Blue Cross Blue Shield contracts. We have sent a letter to Blue Cross 
Blue Shield that we will go off the panel unless we can agree upon renegotiating 
the contract. Through Board direction in the past, we have said we won't give 
anyone a better discount than we give ourselves. 
Medical Staff Development: 
In our recruitment efforts for an additional Pediatrician, we have no viable 
options at this time. We are seriously pursuing another provider for Obstetrics. 
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Dr. Brilliant has indicated he will look somewhere else if an MBA program is 
not available through USU this Fall. 
Dnhesne Valley Medical Clinic: 
Although we had made an offer to Gene Toole, P.A., which he had accepted for 
a position at the Duchesne Valley Medical Clinic, he has not proven to be 
honorable in his dealings with us. He was scheduled to start on July 1 at the 
DVMC but didn't come nor did he call us. Dr. Pehrson has been helping out in 
the clinic. He also came with a proposal to provide service for the clinic. The 
feeling of the advisory board of the clinic was that they wanted someone to live 
in the community. Roger Marett has talked with Duane Draper, P.A. IN Alaska, 
who has given notice on his job there and will come on August 12. Dr. Pehrson 
came with a second proposal to oversee the clinic and sign off for the P. A. Dr. 
Pehrson will provide full coverage on Monday and Friday for specific hours and 
will work later if patients are coming or appointments are made. The P. A. will 
cover Altamont and Tabiona Monday and Friday and will work on Tuesday and 
Thursday at DVMC. He will work a 12-hour shift in ER on Wednesday and also 
do another shift in Altamont. This would give Monday, Wednesday, Friday 
coverage in Altamont; Monday and Friday coverage in Tabiona; physician 
coverage Monday and Friday and P.A. coverage Tuesday, Wednesday and 
Thursday at DVMC. We can cover all the clinics this way. Dr. Hal Mitchell 
has indicated that if Dr. Pehrson is willing to make a larger commitment, then he 
should be given the opportunity to do so. Dr. Smith has also given notice that he 
won't be going to Altamont. 
Duane Draper, P. A., will receive $52,000 a year, his housing, benefits and 
mileage plus some ER shifts. 
Outpatient Pharmacy: 
We are currently getting reports on medical systems, shelving and layouts for the 
outpatient pharmacy. We are also recruiting a pharmacist. We will be talking 
once again with Don Truman and Bob Benson next week. They would like to 
hear our offer for buying their pharmacy business. We feel $100,000 to 
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$120,000 is a top offer for what Basin Pharmacy has. Several options for 
pharmacists were discussed with salary ranges from $50,000 to $75,000 
annually. 
AKCH Directorship: 
Mark Dalley, who has significant experience in hospital management, comes to 
ARCH as the new Director. Next Tuesday, a strategic planning meeting will be 
held. Mark Stoddard's group has been invited to join in this discussion process. 
Funding for ARCH runs out in September of next year. The question remains as 
to whether we are going to be financially able to keep the organization viable. 
The only revenue generation is the $5,000 paid by each member hospital in 
annual dues. Frontier Recovery is a separate service which generates between 
$50,000 and $60,000, a great portion of which is at our expense. 
Milragp Policy! 
Brad LeBaron presented to the Board a policy regarding mileage reimbursement 
for meetings relating to Board service. This policy will allow for Board 
members to submit a form for meetings attended in addition to the regularly 
scheduled monthly Board Meeting. This will not mean another stipend over the 
one received by the Board for the monthly meeting. 
Answering Mnrhinfrs/FflY Machine? 
Due to the difficulty experienced in contacting Board Members on numerous 
occasions, a discussion was held regarding the purchase of answering machines 
and/or fax machines as a better means of communication between the hospital 
and the Board. 
Advertising: 
Concern has been expressed over the marketing impact Ashley Valley is making 
with ads on TV and the radio. Brad LeBaron and Kyla Allred met with Josh 
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Graham, marketing and advertising consultant, who has been commissioned to 
put together an advertising campaign for us. 
Harry Fieldsted, Chairman 
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1 any policies regarding contracts with medical staff members 
2 as a result of the disagreement with Dr. Hardy? 
3 A. I'm not aware of any changes that were made. 
4 Q. Were you aware, for example, if the hospital 
5 decided to eliminate just cause provisions in contracts? 
6 A. I don't know. It may still be present. 
I 
7 Q. There were no such discussions to your knowledge? 
8 A. Not that I can recall. 
9 Q. I believe I asked you earlier if you were aware 
10 of whether or not Dr. Allred's contract was written? 
11 A. I don't know. 
12 Q. You have no knowledge of whether or not currently 
13 it's written or if it was ever written? 
14 A. I don't know. I was told that he has a contract 
15 for the emergency room. So I suspect he probably does have a 
16 written contract, but as far as the pathology services go I 
17 really don't know. 
18 Q. I want to go back to the time period shortly 
19 before Dr. Allred arrived on the scene. He came into the 
2 0 area I believe the spring to early summer 1996. Prior to 
21 that time were you aware of the hospital being interested in 
22 getting greater pathology coverage? 
23 A. Yes. From time to time I would do biopsies, 
24 breast biopsies, biopsies of the pancreas. These are needle 
25 biopsies. We always had to schedule those biopsies on a day 
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that Dr. Hardy would be here. And to tell a woman that she 
needs to wait four or five days for a biopsy is not an easy 
thing. They generally decide to go out to Salt Lake to have 
it done the next day or the day after. It was evident that 
more services could be provided. 
Q. You said that you would perform the fine needle 
aspirations? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It is typical for a radiologist to do that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's a standard part of radiology? 
A. We often use the imaging modalities to guide the 
needle and that's why generally the radiologist do those 
things. 
Q. So that would be an example then of when a 
radiologist would need a pathologist, when you do a fine 
needle aspiration say for example to check a lump in a 
breast? 
A. Right. You want the pathologist there to make 
sure that on two passes or three passes of the needle in the 
breast you've gotten enough representative cells. Although I 
was trained in histology a long time ago I don't try to 
pretend that I can read slides any more, 
Q. I was thinking you were saying you wanted the 
pathologist there to assist to make sure that you got a good 
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A. That's correct. 
Q. Withdraw the sample based on some pictures 
perhaps? 
A. Right. 
Q. And then you would take it in and that needs to 
be done immediately. It would immediately be taken to the 
pathologist? 
A. It's best if a pathologist is right there next to 
me when I'm doing it so that they can tell me — when we take 
needle biopsies sometimes we're using large gauge needles and 
the danger is for bleeding. And a kidney that's very 
vascular you don't want to make six passes with a needle if 
one will do. And that's why we'll do one pass and take that 
piece of tissue and have them take a look at it so they know 
I don't have to do the second and third passes. It increases 
the risk of bleeding to the patient. 
Q. Is it typical in the kind of situation you just 
described to me that the pathologist would be standing by 
there? 
A. In my experience at Jefferson we always had a 
pathologist by us or a fellow. 
Q. Or a fellow, someone who was doing a fellowship 
in pathology? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The procedure if Dr. Hardy wasn't actually on 
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site would be to wait? 
A. Often times it would be to wait until he was here 
that day and then do the fine needle aspirations when he was 
here, 
Q. You said often. What about the not often times? 
A. Occasionally we would do a soft tissue biopsy if 
it were superficial and we could do safely two or three 
passes and then send the tissue out. We just put it in a 
formula and send the container to the lab and the lab would I 
guess send it to him. 
Q. That would be the procedure, you would send it to 
the lab, the lab would send it on to Dr. Hardy at Castleview 
for example? 
A. Right. 
Q. So when you same here you were accustomed to 
having a pathologist right there and it was an adjustment for 
you not to have a pathologist available all the time? 
A. Yes, the total number of cases probably wasn't a 
lot. We don't do biopsies every day, but in those instances 
— plus I learn a lot from the pathologists. Generally 
radiologists and pathologists work closely together. I 
biopsy a lump in the breast and that pathologist tells me 
that was benign tissue, you shouldn't be doing that any 
more. And I learn from that so the next six times I don't 
have to repeat my mistake. Or I say these are suspicious 
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calcifications and he looks at them and says that's right, 
that's the very early stages of cancer. And so that 
reinforces my selecting those type of calcifications for 
biopsy in the future. We work closely together and I learn a 
lot from pathologists. 
Q. You said that the number of these needle biopsies 
weren't that high. What would you estimate the number 
would be? 
A. Probably not much more than two a month if that. 
(Off the record.) 
Q. Before we took a brief break you testified that 
the needle biopsies would occur two times a month if that; is 
that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Before that you testified that you saw a need for 
more pathology coverage so that there would not have to be a 
delay between the time someone needed a needle aspiration and 
the day the pathologist was there? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Even though those needle aspirations were only 
done two times a month if that you still believe the 
increased coverage was justified? 
A. You know, you realize if I'm only doing two a 
month there are probably a bunch more out there that are 
simply saying I'm not waiting four days or a week. And so 
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you lose a large volume of business. It's not so much the 
book of business, but it's the convenience to the patient, 
and not only the convenience to the patient but the faith 
those patients have in your hospital. If they feel every 
time Mrs. so and so my next door neighbor needed a biopsy but 
she had to go to Salt Lake to have it done, they lose 
confidence in the hospital. We're here to serve the people. 
So we try to do as much and as good of work as we can. 
Q. The option for Mrs. Jones or Mrs. Smith would be 
however not necessarily to go to Salt Lake, but wait three 
days? 
A. Yes, until the pathologist came. I can tell you 
from talking to lots of women that have masses, there are 
very few that are comfortable enough or cavalier enough to 
say fine, I'll wait. They all want it done now if possible. 
Q. Would you say that that is more limited to the 
potential breast cancer situation? 
A. Yes. I think women are generally more health 
conscious. Most men you end up waiting months to get them 
into the hospital. I think when we talk about doing the 
prostrate biopsies you don't find very many volunteers for 
that. 
Q. In your experience though often did a woman 
choose to go to another hospital rather than waiting three or 
four days and have it done here? 
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A, It was fairly common. I couldn't tell you a 
specific number of times in a week. 
Q. How about percentages? Half when given the 
choice would go to another hospital rather than wait three or 
four days or 75 percent or 5 percent roughly speaking? 
A. Roughly I would say 75 to 80 percent would go to 
a different hospital. 
Q. In what percentage of the two or so times a month 
of the needle aspirations would the breast lump women be? 
What percentage? 
A. That's a small number, but over the year probably 
60 percent, 65 percent of the biopsies would be breast I'm 
guessing. 
Q. You said about 60 to 65 percent of the one to two 
a month of needle aspirations. So that would be? 
A. I was figuring on a year. 
Q. On a year. So that would be about 14 in a year 
and out of those you would say 75 to 80 percent of those 
would go elsewhere. So that would be eight or so. Does that 
sound about right? 
A. I don't know. It seems to me that more women 
went out for biopsies than eight or nine. 
Q. In a year? 
A. Right. I wouldn't be surprised if it were three 
or four a month that went out. 
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Q. Is that something you would have records on? 
A. No. They make their own decisions with their 
private physicians and do their own thing. 
Q. UBMC wouldn't have any record? 
A. No. 
Q. Now that we7re briefly on that question of 
records, do you have any records, personal notes or anything 
of that nature that you kept contemporaneous to this time 
period at issue? 
A. No. 
Q. Day timer? 
A. No. 
Q. Computer notes? 
A. No. 
Q. Journal? 
A. I don,t have time. 
Q. So did you ever address what you saw as a need 
for more pathology coverage to the administration, to other 
medical staff members, to the board of trustees or to anyone 
at UBMC? 
A. On numerous occasions physicians concurred with 
the need for more pathology services. And in those instances 
I may have gone to the administration. I would not have 
spoken to the board about it. I would have gone to — I may 
have gone to the chief of staff also. That would have been 
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the normal route for me to express those needs, 
Q. The normal route would be to the administrator? 
A. Administrator or the chief of staff. 
Q. You said you may have gone to one of those 
persons to discuss this. Do you remember? 
A. I'm pretty sure that I spoke to the 
administrator. I don't recall depending on who was chief of 
staff whether I would have spoken to them or not. Sometimes 
I may not be on speaking terms with one of them. 
Q. That never happens among doctors, does it? 
A. That's the way of life. 
Q. So you're fairly certain that you went and talked 
with the administrator. Would that have been Brad LeBaron? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you remember the nature of your discussions? 
Can you tell me about that? 
A. I'm sure I spoke to him and told him that 
additional pathology services would be advantageous if it 
were available. And I believe that most of those discussions 
probably happened when Dr. Allred unrequested came through 
the door and expressed his interest in coming. 
Q. So these discussions that you had with Brad 
LeBaron came in the context of Allred having arrived on the 
scene and expressed an interest? 
A. Right. 
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Q. Was the input that you gave to LeBaron requested 
or was that just on your own initiative? 
A. My own initiative. 
Q. When did you first learn of Dr. Allred's interest 
in locating here? 
A. I think that it was about the time of his first 
visit out here. I don't know if I knew of anything about it 
before he came. I may have. Mr. LeBaron may have said I 
received a phone call from a pathologist and he's interested 
in coming, is there work here for one. 
Q. So it's your recollection that after Allred 
contacted LeBaron, LeBaron went to you and perhaps other 
medical staff members and said do you think we have a need? 
A. Yes, that's correct. 
Q. When Brad LeBaron asked if there was a need, you 
said you thought there was and shortly after that Dr. Allred 
came and made an on-sight visit? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you meet him on that on-site visit? 
A. Probably. 
Q. You don't remember? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. So you didn't have any role in the recruiting of 
Dr. Allred or his visit out here that you remember? 
A. I think the whole medical staff had a role in 
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Ripplinger's understanding is correct. Also discussed was the fact that many times the physician on call 
leaves town without obtaining coverage for his shift. Dr. Buxton moved to fine the physician who does 
not find coverage $100 each time they miss their call time. Dr. Mark Mitchell made a second to the 
motion and the motion carried. 
ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT: 
Brad reported that utilization was down for the month but with the increase usage of outpatient services, 
we were able to stay in the black. 
The medical office building is scheduled for completion in mid September. The possibility of having 
a retail pharmacy in the building is being discussed. Also being discussed is a waiting area near the ER 
which will help the problem of visitors wanting to go into the ER. 
Brad reported that Dr. Thomas Allred, a physician dual-boarded in pathology and emergency medicine 
had come to us about relocating to this area. Dr. Hardy announced that his contract with Columbia has 
been extended to six years instead of the original two to three years. He said he is strongly committed 
to providing the best service he could to our facility including spending more time here. He explained 
that he is in the process of looking for an individual who would free up some of his time to allow greater 
coverage for us. Dr. Hardy expressed concern about another pathologist joining our staff. He stated it 
would be very expensive for the hospital to equip, supply and staff the lab for a full time pathologist. 
He also felt there was not enough work for a full time pathologist. Dr. Hardy then excused himself from 
the meeting. 
There was a lengthy discussion on the possibility of Dr. Allred joining the staff. Dr. Buxton felt that 
we needed to go beyond a CV to make sure the physician will fit in with the staff. Dr. Evans stated that 
having a physician in the community benefitted not just the hospital but the community as a whole. Dr. 
Stewart stated that he felt Dr. Hardy was doing a fine job but having a pathologist on staff would 
increase our pathology services. Brad also pointed out that we did need help in the ER and Dr. Allred 
is willing to supplement his income in that way. Drs. Ripplinger, Buxton and Mark Mitchell expressed 
their support of Dr. Hardy. Dr. Allred will be invited back to the facility to give everyone a chance to 
meet him. Brad also stated that if any member of the staff wanted to make telephone inquiries regarding 
Dr. Allred, he would provide names and telephone numbers of his references. Dr. Buxton felt we did 
not need a full time pathologist and that if we needed help in the ER, we should look at Dr. John 
Masaryk who has expressed an interest in returning to the staff. Dr. Masaryk does not want to relocate 
to the area but would consider commuting from the Wasatch Front. Staff will be notified of Dr. 
Alfred's next visit. 
Meeting adjourned. 
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